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Abstract 
 
With their legal personhood, permanent capital with transferable shares, separation of 
ownership and management, and limited liability for both shareholders and managers, the 
Dutch East India Company (VOC) and subsequently the English East India Company 
(EIC) are generally considered a major institutional breakthrough. Our analysis of the 
business operations and notably the financial policy of the VOC during the company’s 
first two decades in existence shows that its corporate form owed less to foresight than to 
constant piecemeal engineering to remedy original design flaws brought to light by 
prolonged exposure to the strains of the Asian trade. Moreover, the crucial feature of 
limited liability for managers was not, as previously thought, part and parcel of that 
design, but emerged only after a long period of experimenting with various, sometimes 
very ingenious, solutions to the company’s financial bottlenecks.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The intercontinental trading companies set up by the British and Dutch around 1600 are 
generally considered key institutional innovations because of their corporate form (North, 
1990). They pioneered features which later became textbook characteristics of modern 
corporations: a permanent capital, legal personhood, separation of ownership and 
management, limited liability for shareholders and for directors, and tradable shares 
(Kraakman et al., 2004). The success of these trading companies in spearheading 
European colonization is generally associated with the competitive edge lent by their 
particular corporate form, which in turn counts as an example of the superiority of 
Western legal traditions over those in China or the Islamic world (Kuran, 2010a, 2010b). 
The new corporate features are usually seen as purposeful adaptations of existing 
legal forms to the challenges of Europe’s overseas trade with Asia, notably the large 
amounts of capital required, the long duration of voyages, and the increased risks along 
the way (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000; Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire, 2006). 
They are also regarded as closely related to each other, a logical set making up a winning 
formula. This interpretation rests heavily on work by legal scholars seeking to unearth the 
roots of concepts such as limited liability and legal personhood (Van der Heijden, 1908; 
Van Brakel, 1908; Frentrop, 2003; Den Heijer, 2005; Harris, 2000, 2010). However, 
there are two major problems with it. First, for a long time the dominant British and 
Dutch companies faced identical challenges, but differed in their adoption of the 
associated legal solutions. By the early 1620s the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie or VOC, founded in 1602) possessed transferable shares, a 
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permanent capital, and limited liability for owners and managers (Gelderblom and 
Jonker, 2004; Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 2011). This contrasts with the English 
East India Company (EIC, founded in 1600), which introduced similar features only 
during the 1650s (Harris, 2000). Second, while this particular lag may relate to political 
factors, notably the need for limited government (Harris, 2010; Dari Mattiacci et al. 
2012), the time it took for the VOC to assemble various features shows that they did not 
form a coherent logical set from the start, but instead emerged one-by-one in response to 
particular circumstances, not the general challenges associated with the Asian trade. The 
company had transferable shares and limited liability for shareholders from the outset, 
but obtained a permanent capital only in 1612 and limited liability for directors in 1623.  
 In this paper we analyze the VOC’s operations and financial policy during its first 
two decades to argue that the VOC’s adoption of corporate features was not an 
intentional and logical adaptation of existing legal forms in response to general 
challenges such as the longer duration and increased risk of the Asian trade.  Instead, we 
argue, the VOC’s evolution should be understood as a process of piecemeal engineering 
to eliminate the financial constraints created by constantly changing operating conditions 
in Europe and overseas.1 Four key factors determined the envelope within which 
directors acted. First, the boundaries of the business as originally conceived, and notably 
the total dependency on circulating capital for all investment. The company’s operations 
created significant and long-term financing needs, which could not be met with the 
                                                 
1 Cornelis de Heer (1929, p. 5-18) already identified the financial problems related to the decentralized 
governance structure of the company but he did connect these to the organizational changes of the first two 
decades. Niels Steensgaard (1982) documented the piecemeal engineering of the corporate form but 
overlooked the financial constraints shaping this process. 
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prevailing use of circulating capital.2 This condemned the directors to juggle with 
solutions to particular issues instead of giving the company more stability by reforging 
the available elements of its constitution. Second, the European demand for spices, which 
proved too small and grew too slowly to generate the revenues needed to sustain the 
VOC’s level of investment. Third, the unforeseen continuous rise of the company’s 
overseas investment; and fourth, the pressure on the scarce financial resources of the need 
to satisfy shareholders’ legitimate demands for dividends. In other words, the VOC’s 
corporate form resulted not from the logic of any legal system, contractual form, or set of 
forms, but from a process of piecemeal engineering to relieve frictions between flaws in 
the company’s original design, specific operational demands, and the available finance 
options. This piecemeal engineering generated both stopgaps and more lasting solutions 
which gradually hardened into corporate features as we know them.3  
 The paper is organized as follows. The first section analyzes how, between 1603 
and 1609, low sales revenues and sharply rising costs confronted directors with the 
impossibility of keeping to the original intention of relying on circulating capital for 
finance and of winding up the company in 1612. Consequently from 1609 directors 
strove to obtain a permanent capital, which they could only get by increasing the 
company’s cash constraints and by eliminating the option of raising more equity (Section 
2). As Section 3 shows, this forced the company to continue relying on circulating capital 
as main source of finance, topped up with all kinds of expedients. In 1617, Section 4 
                                                 
2 We examine the evolutionary process leading to the corporate form and not its costs. Adam Smith (1776) 
already referred to the costs of directors managing other people’s money and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
describe these agency costs in general. Ville and Jones (1996) argue that the early chartered corporations 
were not efficient organizations but simply a contractually efficient form for extracting monopoly rents. 
3 Our analysis contributes to the finance and growth discussion, where some economists argue that 
financial development does not create growth, but that finance simple adapts to challenges from the real 
sector (Robinson, 1952). Others perceive financial market development to be a crucial condition for 
economic growth (Levine, 2005). 
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argues, the company directors finally tackled one of the charter’s flaws by mutually 
guaranteeing the debts contracted by their respective chambers, thereby gaining access to 
crucial additional resources. When investors started questioning the status of bonds sold 
by other chambers in the main money market, Amsterdam, directors unilaterally rejected 
their personal liability for company debt in 1623. The conclusion explores the 
implications of these findings for our understanding how and why modern corporate 
features emerged. 
 
 
CONTINUING AS BEFORE 
 
Starting in 1595, merchants from the Dutch Republic built up a very successful overseas 
trade with Asia. In seven years they sent separate expeditions totaling 80 ships from 
Amsterdam, Middelburg, and Rotterdam. These expeditions usually yielded high returns, 
so directors had little difficulty in persuading investors to roll over stakes from one 
venture into the next (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2004). The intercity rivalry weakened the 
overall Dutch position overseas, however, notably in the face of the competition with 
Spain, Portugal, and Britain. Consequently the Estates General strove to merge the 
various local initiatives into a single, strong company, and achieved this with the launch 
of the VOC in 1602. The company’s charter reflected the weight of political priorities 
over commercial ones by putting the Estates General in full control (Gelderblom, De 
Jong and Jonker, 2011). 
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The VOC changed the governance of the Asian trade, but not its financial 
structure. While the charter and trade monopoly bestowed by the Estates General were to 
run 21 years, the new company itself was conceived as a succession of separate, 
overlapping expeditions, the returns of one financing another. After ten years the entire 
concern was to be liquidated and the capital returned to shareholders, unless they chose to 
reinvest in a successor company set up to exploit the second half of the monopoly. 
Subscribers to the first account paid up in four installments. The first three were large 
enough to equip a fleet, but the fourth and smallest one in the autumn of 1606 amounted 
to no more than 8.3 per cent of capital, that is to say the company’s founders clearly 
expected that by then enough ships would have come back from the first expedition to 
finance the fourth.  
 This back-to-back financing shows that the company’s 6.4 million guilders’ 
capital was not considered as money set aside to finance the fixed assets needed, but as 
circulating capital, a revolving fund to be replenished from sales revenues. The scope for 
fixed investments was thus limited to the money remaining after the equipment of 
subsequent fleets. In a large consolidated company this should not have mattered, but 
then the early VOC was no such thing because the merger had only been a partial one. 
The central board or Heren XVII laid down policy, prices, terms, and conditions, while 
the directors of the company’s six chambers (kamers) remained responsible for running 
their share of the joint operations from their respective ports: equipping ships, recruiting 
labour, selling produce, and paying bills. Consequently an individual chamber’s cash 
flow, and by extension its participation in expeditions, depended largely on the success or 
otherwise of preceding expeditions. 
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 The boundaries of the revolving finance system become clear when we examine 
the VOC’s first expeditions a little closer. The company kept up a regular flow of 10-12 
ships on each of its first three expeditions between December 1603 and April 1606 for a 
total of 32. The biggest chamber, Amsterdam, provided the bulk with 19 vessels (See 
Appendix 1). The size of these expeditions was determined by the flow of installments 
coming in, with the amount of silver sent out to pay for purchases figuring as a balancing 
item. Even so the preparations for a new expedition started some time before 
shareholders had to pay up. The company charter had made a provision for that by 
awarding shareholders paying up early an eight per cent interest until the fleet sailed.4 
Since the Amsterdam chamber could borrow for seven per cent or less on the local 
money market, directors preferred that to calling subscriptions early, borrowing up to 
400,000 guilders between January 1604 and April 1605 to prepare the second fleet 
(Figure 1). From July 1605 they did so again to anticipate on installments coming in, 
repaying most of the money six months later, either from the installments due in October 
1605, or from sales revenues.5 In April 1605 its ship Hof van Holland had returned to 
port after an exceptionally swift round trip of only 476 days, and sales from its cargo may 
have helped to extinguish debt. Whatever the case, by 1606 the revolving finance system 
did work for Amsterdam. During that year four more ships arrived back, enabling 
directors to pay off most of their debts. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
                                                 
4 Den Heijer (2005), p. 61; NA. 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 7162, carta 72-302.  
5 The Amsterdam chamber spent less money on the third fleet than the amount it received from the third 
installment: De Korte (1984), p. 10. 
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The other chambers had a tough time keeping up. The second biggest chamber, Zeeland 
with a 25 per cent stake in operations, participated with two to three ships in each of the 
initial three expeditions, but its first ship returned only in October 1606, followed by a 
second one eight months later. Though Zeeland immediately started selling products, 
sales had generated no more than 650,000 guilders by July 1608 (See Appendix 1). 
Meanwhile the four small chambers could only muster sufficient resources for alternating 
participations. The chambers of Enkhuizen and Hoorn joined the first expedition with 
two ships each, skipped the second one, and then joined the third with one each. Delft 
and Rotterdam passed up on the first expedition, joined the second, skipped the third. Out 
of these four only Hoorn had received any products to sell, and thus money to reinvest, 
from its previous expedition. Both Rotterdam and Enkhuizen had lost ships, and Delft 
welcomed back its first vessel only in 1608. 
One reason for the lack of return freight was the directors’ decision to devote part 
of the company resources to warfare, both to establish a firm foothold and in order to 
fight Spain and Portugal to please their main principal, the Estates General of the 
Republic (Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 2011). This meant sending over soldiers and 
investing in hardware such as forts and cannon, but also keeping ships on the spot. The 
company began to build up an Asian fleet by ordering nine ships of the first three fleets to 
stay there, and it supplemented this force by lengthening the tour of duty for other ships 
leaving the Dutch Republic to more than three years (1,200 days) on average (Figure 2).6 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
6 Cf. also Parthesius (2010) on the size of the Asian fleet in the first half of the 17th century. 
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Long tours of duty of course meant that chambers had to wait longer for return cargoes 
but it also translated into higher costs. More of the silver sent out to Asia had to be used 
locally for buying food and paying wages. Two further factors strained the cash flow. The 
chambers built up back pay liabilities, due immediately when ships finally returned. 
Between December 1606 and July 1608 the Middelburg chamber alone paid 130,000 
guilders in costs over returning ships in back pay, storage, and directors’ fees (Table 1).7 
Moreover, returning ships were totally worn out, so re-equipping them cost nearly as 
much as buying new, but the VOC had not budgeted for such a rapid depreciation rate.  
 
[Table 1 about here]  
 
Meanwhile spice markets were still supplied largely from stocks brought ashore by the 
early companies. This meant that the VOC could concentrate on establishing its overseas 
position without having to worry about the Republic’s position as a leading market for 
spices, but at the same time it curtailed the VOC’s own sales volume, leading to a crunch 
in 1606. The company had taken over the management of Van Warwijck’s 1602 
expedition of fourteen ships and wanted to sell the stocks of that enterprise first.8 
However, at the same time the VOC needed money to equip a fourth fleet with sufficient 
men and arms to bolster its overseas position and conduct the ongoing peace negotiations 
                                                 
7 As early as 1608 the VOC operated an ingenious system enabling its employees to assign part of their pay 
to relatives, thereby at the same time smoothing the back pay liabilities problem: NA 1.0.02 VOC, Inv. No. 
221, Resolutions Heren XVII, 4 August 1608. 
8 Cf. for Zeeland’s sales of spices from the fourteen ships: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349 Copieboeck 
van diversche Rekeningen, carta 21, 39, 50, 77, 82, 122-125, 127. Dividends from Amsterdam’s six ships 
in the 1602 fleet paid to the Amsterdam investor Hans Thijs suggest that by November 1607 sales from 
these ships already amounted to 870,000 guilders (University Library Leiden, Biblioteca Thysiana, Ledgers 
Hans Thijs 1604-1610; Gelderblom and Jonker, 2004). In addition to spices purchased in Asia, the fleet of 
Warwijck also captured the Portuguese carrack Santa Catharina, a prize worth 3.4 million guilders: Van 
Dam 1927, Vol. I.2, p. 485). 
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with Spain from strength. Gathering that money took time, so the sailing of the fourth 
fleet was postponed to December 1607, but even that was insufficient. Middelburg could 
muster its share in the expedition only by obtaining a subsidy from the Zeeland Estates 
and Enkhuizen decided not to take part at all.9 Rotterdam and Delft, which like 
Enkhuizen still waited on their first ship to return, probably obtained funds through 
Amsterdam to finance their participation of one ship each in the 1607 expedition. 
Amsterdam chamber itself had to stretch its resources, short-term debt rising with another 
500,000 guilders during the first half of 1608 (Figure 1). The money may have been used 
to cover the costs of returning ships, but Amsterdam had also started to relieve the cash 
constraints of other chambers by allowing them to run substantial overdrafts on their 
current account.10  
These internal credit lines required changing the VOC’s governance by 
introducing uniform accounting standards and procedures as well as regular inspections 
so as to inspire the necessary mutual confidence. Chambers took turns in pairs to inspect 
others and all chambers had to submit statements of revenues and expenses to each 
meeting of the central board,  the Heren XVII.11 By providing a firm basis for easing the 
cash flow constraints of individual chambers this accounting harmonization signaled a 
marked step forward, but it failed to improve the VOC’s overall cash position. The 
                                                 
9 NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11046, Resolution of the Zeeland Estates, 11 September 1606, granting a 
subsidy of 300,000 guilders to the VOC, funded with customs revenues and payable over the course of 
three years, ‘to build fortications and establish and maintain a garrison in East India’. 
10 For instance, in July 1610 Middelburg’s cash outflows exceeded inflows by 500,000 guilders. Eighty per 
cent of this shortfall was covered by an overdraft of 400,000 guilders on the current account with 
Amsterdam of 400,000 guilders (NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, Copieboek rekeningen Zeeland, carta 
74). Loans between chambers were coordinated in the meetings of the Heren XVII: Van Dam 1927, I, p. 
233; De Heer, 1929, pp. 12-13, 26-27. 
11 On May 26th, 1606, the company directors decided that chambers would inspect each others’ accounts  
(NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 221, fol. 66). On August 4th, 1608, the Heren XVII resolved that the chambers 
had to send each other monthly reports: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 221, fol. 253.  
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maturity mismatch between short-term debts and longer voyages remained, creating 
liquidity or refinancing risk (Diamond, 1991) and forcing the company to reduce its 
operations. During 1608 and 1609 only three small ships were sent to Asia and it took 
until January 1610 before the VOC could again muster a full expedition of nine ships.  
 
 
PAYING FOR PERMANENCE 
 
The dependency on circulating capital for finance thus formed a serious check on 
operations, let alone on expansion. Yet expansion was what the company needed. In 1608 
the commander of the second fleet, Cornelis Matelieff de Jonge, returned to the Republic 
and sounded the alarm in a series of memos to the company directors, the Estates 
General, and to prominent public figures such as Hugo Grotius and Johan van 
Oldenbarnevelt.12 According to him the company had wrongly attempted to combine 
warfare with business, and therefore failed to achieve much in either. The situation 
demanded a determined push which the admirals of successive fleets had not been able to 
give. Matelieff recommended that the VOC put its operations on a more permanent 
footing by establishing a central hub, such as the Portuguese possessed in Malaya, and by 
appointing a governor-general there to take charge. Only then could the company hope to 
get a firm grip on spice supplies. Matelieff recognized that this policy change required 
heavy investment, but considered this necessary to realize the VOC’s military and 
commercial aims (Van Rees, 1868; Gaastra, 1985; Witteveen, 2011).  
                                                 
12 Matelieff de Jonge to Van Oldenbarnevelt, 18 mei 1609 (Veenendaal 1962, p. 319-327); Matelieff de 
Jonge to Grotius, 31 August 1610, Correspondence Hugo Grotius, 198A, p. 71-75. 
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[Table 2 about here]  
 
However, the company’s finances left no room for long-term investments in military 
spending. In 1609 the VOC’s annual war costs already amounted to more than 400,000 
guilders in wages, food, maintenance, and depreciation (Table 2). Sales yielded barely 
enough to cover these expenses, let alone expand the military effort or sustain long-term 
investment. Moreover, with the VOC’s statutory liquidation only three years away, large 
investments would seriously reduce the chances of launching a successor company, for 
investors were unlikely to participate in another venture with high costs and low returns 
(Dari Mattiacci et al., 2012). Matelieff understood that the statutory liquidation created an 
unbridgeable conflict of interests between current and prospective investors. The former 
had no interest to invest heavily in operations if these were to prove of little or no value 
by 1612, while the latter had no incentive to participate in a successor if the old one had 
failed to establish a firm position overseas. Matelieff came to the logical conclusion and 
recommended to the Estates General that the statutory liquidation be ignored so as to turn 
the VOC into a permanent concern (Steensgaard, 1982; Witteveen, 2011).  
Matelieff’s proposal did not remain secret; in May 1609 Isaac Lemaire, a former 
VOC director who had left the board in 1605 after policy dispute, angrily petitioned 
Grand Pensionary Johan van Oldenbarnevelt. Ignoring the statutory liquidation would be 
illegal, improper, and unfair to shareholders, Lemaire argued, and warned that without 
dividends, full accounts and liquidation, no investor would subscribe to a successor 
(Frentrop, 2009; Shareholder rights, 2009). On the basis of his subsequent bear raid on 
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the VOC shares Lemaire earned his reputation as a rancorous renegade, but his petition 
was a fair argument about a point of law and his justified complaint about the company’s 
failure to pay dividends must have reflected a wider dissatisfaction (Van Dillen, 1930; 
Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 2011). The VOC directors responded by posting 
dividends, clearly in the hope of appeasing shareholders and thereby smoothing political 
opposition against Matelieff’s proposal. During 1610 and 1612 the VOC awarded 
dividends totaling 162.5 per cent, or 10.4 million guilders, an amount clearly meant as a 
pay-off to shareholders: full reimbursement plus ten times the going interest rate of 6.25 
per cent for each year their capital had been tied up in the company (Steensgaard, 1982; 
Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 2011). The board could now claim that it had fulfilled a 
key part of their charter obligations.  
 This was a risky gambit because the VOC lacked the cash to pay dividends, but 
the directors probably expected sales to pick up. The early companies’ stocks were 
dwindling and the Twelve Years’ Truce with Spain (1609-1621) opened markets in the 
Spanish Netherlands and southern Europe. Moreover, the first dividend was announced 
just after four heavily laden ships had arrived back during the summer of 1610. However, 
even fast rising sales revenues would be insufficient to equip new fleets and pay the 
dividend, so the VOC offered the dividend largely in kind using the company’s own 
official prices as conversion measure. In August and September shareholders were 
awarded an initial 125 per cent in mace or money followed by another 7.5 per cent in 
money during September.13  
                                                 
13 NA 1.11.01.01 Aanwinsten Eerste Afdeling, Inv. No. 626 (1893, 29b), Resolutions of the Heren XVII, 
30 August 1610 (75%), 15 September 1610 (50%), and 16 September 1610 (7.5%).  
14 
 
If directors had hoped that shareholders would accept the payments in kind, they 
were mistaken, as dividend payments recorded by the Zeeland Chamber show (Table 3). 
The directors of the Middelburg chamber had anticipated on the dividends during 1609, 
selling shareholders small quantities of spices, with one quarter of their value being 
discounted against future dividends. Three years later, in November 1612, the chamber 
had still only paid out 0.5 million guilders, 38.5 per cent of equity, as dividend in kind. If 
we take this ratio as representative for the company as a whole, dividends in kind 
amounted no more than 2.5 million guilders until the end of 1612, i.e. barely a quarter of 
the total.14 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The shareholders’ refusal to accept dividends in kind left the company with a substantial 
liability at a time when it needed all its money for operations in Asia. Though the 1609 
truce with Spain appeared to ease the pressure of warfare overseas somewhat, the 
company could not afford to let down its guard there. Under the terms of the truce a 
resumption of hostilities in Asia would not necessarily have repercussions for the 
situation in Europe and news about a military buildup in the Philippines raised the spectre 
of a Spanish offensive. Consequently the VOC spent an estimated 2.4 million guilders to 
send 14 ships in three smaller fleets sailing between January 1610 and 1611, and another 
2.6 million guilders on 16 ships between 1611 and 1612 (cf. Appendix 1).  
                                                 
14 In November 1613 the company directors reported to the Estates General that up to then the VOC had 
paid 57.5 per cent in cash and only ‘some spices to some shareholders’ (‘eenige specerijen aen sommigen 
uuijtgedeelt’): NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 368, 22 November 1613. 
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These equipments tested the financial limits of several chambers. The directors 
tried to offload some of their costs on the Estates General by petitioning for a subsidy, 
claiming that a commercial company ought not to bear costs incurred for the country’s 
interests, but they had limited success.15 Between 1609 and 1612 the Estates General 
awarded subsidies of only 390,000 guilders in tax relief plus some material assistance in 
the form of ships and ordnance (De Jong 2005, 116). The company therefore had to 
finance the expeditions primarily from money raised by the selling of goods brought 
ashore during 1610 and 1611. To speed up revenues the chambers offered buyers rebates, 
i.e. discounts on a given sale’s price for cash up front rather than after the customary term 
of nine months (Schalk, 2010). 
The discounts generally translated into an annualized interest rate of slightly over 
10 per cent, which was high compared to regular debt, but rebates offered the advantage 
of not exposing the directors to creditors’ claims as borrowing on the money market 
would. Admittedly, charter clause 47 exempted the directors from liability for specified 
debts, such as wage arrears. In line with the literature we have interpreted this clause 
before as really meaning to exempt them from liability for all debts (Gelderblom, De 
Jong and Jonker, 2011), but new material has made us change our view. Surviving VOC 
bonds show that directors contracted debt for their personal account, pledging their 
person and goods in the accustomed way of such bonds.16 Moreover, we possess clear 
indications that outsiders did indeed hold them personally liable for these debts. When in 
1611 the Middelburg chamber had postponed paying import duties for so long that the 
                                                 
15 NA 1.01.03 Staten Generaal, Inv. No. 4841, fol. 89v, resolution 8 September 1609; fol. 100-107v 
petition, 16/17 November 1610. 
16 Three such bonds in NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 7064 (insurance contract),  Film No. 4883, one bond 
from December 1621 and two from January 1622. 
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Zeeland Estates’ patience had run out, officials did not sequester the chamber’s 
possessions, the logical course of action if Clause 47 had given directors full limited 
liability. Instead, the Estates threatened them with imprisonment for debt.17 This personal 
liability had not really been a problem as long as debts raised were fairly quickly 
extinguished by incoming shareholders’ installments, but it clearly put a limit on the 
sums and terms which the directors were prepared to shoulder.  
The VOC’s precarious finances will not have encouraged them to increase their 
exposure. In July 1612 the Estates General formally allowed the company to ignore the 
statutory liquidation due that year. To appease shareholders directors gave them the still 
unpaid 7.5 per cent in cash promised back in 1610, and then offered those who had 
refused to accept spices a payment of 50 per cent in cash on condition that the remainder 
of their dividend would be paid later still, 42.5 per cent in cash in 1613 and 62.5 per cent 
in cash or nutmeg in 1616.18 In other words, the cash required to pay reluctant 
shareholders their promised due was such a strain that payment had to be stretched out 
over a very long period, effectively forcing them to re-invest their earnings for a period of 
uncertain duration. Moreover, the unilateral decision to ignore liquidation barred the 
company from raising more equity, since snubbed investors were unlikely to subscribe 
without demanding firm guarantees that charter clauses would be honored in the future.  
Permanence thus came at the high price of further financial strains. Yet the 
company needed a stronger and more durable financial basis to maintain its overseas 
                                                 
17 NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11046, resolutions Estates Zeeland concerning the VOC, 1607-1700, 9 May, 
8 June, 20 and 22 September 1611. The resolutions do not mention what happened, so the two sides 
probably settled. 
18 NA 1.11.01.01 Aanwinsten Eerste Afdeling, Inv. No. 626 (1893, 29b), Resolutions of the Heren XVII, 
March 1612 (30% in nutmeg), 31 October 1612 (57.5% in cash), August 1613 (42.5%), and 
August/October 1616 (62.5% in nutmeg or cash).  Schalk (2010) shows that Enkhuizen postponed part of 
the first payment until 1615.   
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position and finally reap its benefits. If not, the VOC risked losing its spice trade share to 
the Spanish and Portuguese, or else to English or French traders looking for an 
opportunity to move in.   
 
 
ESTABLISHING AN OPERATIONAL HUB 
 
Our reconstruction of sales revenues and equipment costs, summarized in Figure 3, 
demonstrates to good effect the precariousness of the VOC’s overall position after 1612 
and more specifically the failings of the circulating capital system.19 Until 1610 the early 
companies’ remaining stocks restricted the volume of company sales. Once these had 
sold out the VOC’s sales picked up and rose to an estimated 4 million guilders per year in 
1612, but up to and including 1616 annual sales averaged still no more than 3 million 
guilders a year. At first sight this ought to have sufficed for raising the size of fleets sent 
out, but in fact the company could only invest some 2 million guilders a year and in 1615 
even only half that amount, simply because the return costs continued to absorb large 
sums of money and dividends due in 1613 and 1616 may have required up to 5 million 
guilders.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
                                                 
19 We estimated annual sales on the basis of the average monthly sales calculated in Appendix 1, table G. 
The reported sales in Figure 3 are an approximation of actual sales revenues because we do not know the 
distribution of sales within the periods for which the VOC directors reported their commission fees, nor do 
we know how often rebates (reducing the sales value in exchange for direct payment) were granted to 
buyers.   
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In these circumstances conserving the company’s overseas position through collaboration 
rather than expansion posed an appealing alternative. If the VOC could form a united 
front against the Iberians with the EIC, for instance, the company could gain military 
strength and offload some of its costs. The EIC had operated quite successfully during 
1609-1612, organizing seven voyages which paid average dividends of 174 per cent per 
voyage (Chaudhuri 1965, 209). This rankled in the Republic. Van Oldenbarnevelt, for 
instance, thought that the British were freeriding on Dutch power and ought to be made to 
pay their share (Van Ittersum 2006, 377). Moreover, in 1613 the EIC followed the VOC’s 
1602 example and had its shareholders commit their money for a span of eight years, 
enabling directors to finance equipments with retained earnings. The EIC also posed a 
threat to the VOC’s attempt to control the market for spices and thereby prop up prices 
and revenues. However, talks between British and Dutch representatives in 1613 and 
again in 1615 ended without resolving any of the issues, sales coordination, joint 
operations, or a possible amalgamation of interests.20 
 Meanwhile the VOC had been corresponding about strategy with its newly 
appointed manager of the Bantam factory and future governor general, Jan Pietersz Coen. 
Like Matelieff before him, Coen argued in January 1614 that the VOC needed to 
establish a permanent operational hub if it was to deal effectively with the Spanish 
aggression and British freeriding on its military efforts. At that moment the VOC lacked 
the money even to maintain a steady flow of ships, let alone to increase efforts. Coen 
accepted this and first wanted the Estates General to step in and send the forces required 
                                                 
20 Nellen, 2007, P. 173-174; Van Ittersum, 2006; Clark, 1935; Van Oldenbarnevelt to Caron, 3 May 1613 
(Veenendaal, 1962, p. 543-546); Cf. Van Oldenbarnevelt to the Dutch ambassador in London, 7 May 1615 
(Veenendaal, 1967, p. 107); See also the report (‘verbaal’) written by Grotius in May 1613 
(Correspondence Hugo Grotius, 627-636). 
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(Colenbrander, 1934, 48-54, 75, 451-474). When the board turned his plan down, Coen 
fell in with a policy suggested by the Amsterdam chamber’s directors, who wanted to 
neutralize the EIC’s potential threat to European prices by raising the amount of silver 
sent out and buy up all spices.21 In November 1615 the board agreed. Subsequent fleets 
were to carry more than the usual amount of silver in order to raise the volume of 
purchases and directors hoped that the resulting sales would also generate the revenues 
needed to mobilize the forces for Coen to capture his hub.22 
 The company’s sales and equipments reported in Figure 3 reflect this policy 
change. From 1616 the VOC raised silver shipments by a factor of two, resulting in larger 
return cargoes and a boost to sales from 250,000 guilders per month in 1616 to more than 
600,000 guilders by the end of 1618.23 This translated into substantially bigger fleets sent 
out; a total of 66 ships left the Republic for Asia between December 1618 and December 
1621, representing a value of almost 17 million guilders. Now Coen could embark on his 
expansion. In 1619 he captured the fort Jacatra on Java, renamed it Batavia, and started to 
build the VOC’s operational hub there. Two years later he launched a campaign to gain 
control over the spice trade by capturing the Moluccas, which he succeeded in doing by 
unleashing a storm of violence (Colenbrander, 1934, 166-169; 234-246).  
 At first sight Coen’s bold expansion appears the result of directors finally 
mastering the revolving finance system simply by raising its scale. However, a closer 
look reveals that this was not the case. The VOC was forced to continue juggling with 
resources and spending priorities as before. For instance, our reconstruction of cash flows 
                                                 
21 Amsterdam directors to Coen, 28 November 1614 and 15 November 1615; Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 294, 
333. 
22 Amsterdam directors to Coen, 15 November 1615; Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 332. 
23 On silver shipments, see Bruijn et al. (1987) vol. I, p. 226-229. 
20 
 
does show a revenue peak in 1618, but directors had to use this money for paying a 
37.5% dividend in 1620 so as to appease shareholders in the run up to the 1622 charter 
expiry.24 Meanwhile annual sales stalled at some four million guilders and stocks 
mounted sharply, while equipment costs continued to rise, peaking at double estimated 
sales revenues in 1621. Consequently the VOC, instead of escaping the constraints of 
revolving capital through expansion, remained caught in it much as before, only at a 
higher level. This forced the directors to explore and finally to move the company’s 
financial boundaries. In 1613 the first of these explorations yielded an intriguing financial 
innovation.  
 
 
THE 1613 INSURANCE CONTRACT 
 
Immediately following the acquisition of permanence and the related restructuring of 
dividend payments in the second half of 1612, directors needed to secure the company’s 
cash position for 1616, when the final installment of cash dividends fell due. This sum 
was too large to secure through rebates or other short-term debt. The chambers and 
Amsterdam in particular never borrowed more than a million guilders in short-term 
deposits, so the directors had to find an alternative. On March 1, 1613 they insured this 
liability with an ingenious contract guaranteeing that the revenues from the fleet setting 
sail that spring would not fall below 3.2 million guilders (Gelderblom, De Jong and 
                                                 
24 In June 1619 the Heeren XVII resolved to pay a 37.5 % cash dividend per 1 April 1620: NA1.11.01.01 
Aanwinsten Eerste Afdeling, Inv. No. 626 (1893, 29b). 
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Jonker, 2012).25 The contract differed from regular insurance policies in setting a specific 
value rather than insuring a particular ship or its cargo (Van Niekerk, 1998, p. 83). That 
value was based on the VOC’s official prices for the standard commodities pepper, 
nutmeg, cloves and mace, and market prices for other goods. Insurers would pay the 
difference between the sales value of the return cargo and the sum insured. With return 
trips averaging 38 months (Figure 2), the policy set a fairly long term of three-and-a-half 
years within which the returns should have materialized. The underwriters were to pay up 
half of the sum eventually due in February 1617, and the other half six months later. 
Ships from the fleet returning after the contract’s due date would still count, the insurers 
being reimbursed pro rata with the proceeds of those cargoes.  
Scholars have regarded this contract as an oddity at best, or else as a con trick 
played by the directors on hapless shareholders and other underwriters, the contract being 
interpreted as a devious way for directors to safeguard their income (Stapel and Den 
Dooren de Jong, 1927). A revision of this perspective is provided by Gelderblom, De 
Jong and Jonker (2012) from the perspective of modern risk management. They describe 
that the contract was offered almost exclusively to shareholders, who took up more than 
95 per cent of the sum underwritten in return for a 5 per cent premium.26 The directors 
themselves bore a disproportionally large share of the risk. In Amsterdam, for instance, 
they owned 14.3 per cent of the company shares at the end of 1612, while they 
                                                 
25 The contract detailed in Van Dam (1977) Vol. I.1, pp. 207-208; see Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker, 
(2012) for an English translation of the policy. 
26 Van Dillen (1958, 81, 97) documented the subscriptions of 101 out of 252 insurers. Together they 
subscribed 1.4 million guilders (76%) out of a total of 1.8 million. All but five of these insurers owned 
shares in the company in December 1612: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 7066. With only 22,000 guilders the 
subscriptions of these outsiders was negligible. The administration of insurers kept by the directors of the 
Zeeland chamber reveals that 69 shareholders and 4 outsiders underwrote the policy in Middelburg. NA 
1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 13860, 13861.  
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underwrote 25 per cent of the policy.27 Given this exposure we may ignore the possibility 
that managerial self-interest drove the directors to insure the company’s 1616 revenues 
(Tufano, 1996). Rather, Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker (2012) argue that the contract 
should be understood in the framework developed by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) 
for modern firms. In 1613 the VOC was exactly the position described by them: facing 
the need to continue heavy, strategic investment, about to reap the benefits but strapped 
for cash and finance. Under such circumstances insurance becomes a sensible safeguard 
for the continuity of operations.  
 For our purpose three aspects of the insurance contract matter. First, the contract, 
by its very ingenuity, shows the VOC directors at wits’ end, having exhausted 
conventional means of raising finance. Second, the company did not use it again, so 
directors succeeded in eliminating the bottleneck which constrained them in 1613.28 
Third, it looks as if the contract’s conditions were probably met (Gelderblom, De Jong 
and Jonker, 2012) and the VOC could well use the money, but did not pursue claims. The 
likely explanation is the fact that virtually all insurers doubled as shareholders, many of 
whom still had an outstanding claim on 62.5% dividend in 1616. Even though the 1613 
policy stipulated that sums due under the contract were not to be offset against any other 
claims between parties, the VOC could hardly press insurers to pay up without risking 
                                                 
27 Based on their initial shareholdings and share transactions registered in the ‘Journaal van Actien’ of the 
company (NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 7066) we can calculate the holdings of the initial directors (excluding 
Isaac Lemaire) at 517,300 guilders in December 1612. In 1613 fourteen directors signed the insurance 
contract for a total of 462,060 guilders (Van Dillen, 1958, pp. 81, 97) 
28 Although the VOC did not use similar insurance contracts after 1613, the EIC did. In the period 1636-
1643 several insurance contracts where issued (Stapel and Den Dooren de Jong, 1927, p. 102-105). 
Typically, the contract size equaled the face value of the debts outstanding. Because the EIC had unlimited 
liability and relied on debt financing, the main purpose of the insurance contract seems to be shielding 
shareholders from claims by debtors. 
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counterpressure to pay up itself. Consequently the company’s lack of cash appears to 
have prevented it from using the ingenious stopgap designed to relieve it in case of need.  
 
 
GROPING TOWARDS LIMITED LIABILITY 
 
Having drafted an ingenious contract only to forego the option of claiming the sum 
insured, the VOC board found itself back at square one, searching for ways to finance its 
overseas expansion. Rebates on spice sales provided insufficient stretch and the Estates-
General limited its support in the form of loans given by the Admiralties to about half a 
million guilders.29 In 1614 the Heren XVII allowed the postponement of dividends due to 
1615, and in 1616 it decided to convert unpaid dividends into interest bearing loans.30 
Meanwhile the Amsterdam chamber continued to borrow money through deposits (Van 
Dillen, 1958: 100-102; Coen Bescheiden IV, 328-329), and once it was decided in 1615 
to send more silver and ships the others followed suit. The Enkhuizen chamber, for 
example, borrowed up to 250,000 guilders during 1616 and 1617 (Schalk, 2010). 
Zeeland, which had managed to equip its fleets from revolving capital until 1616, had to 
borrow almost the entire amount for the single ship sent out in 1617.31  
                                                 
29 A resolution taken by the Estates General on 14 January 1623 records a debt owed by the VOC to the 
Admiralties of 498,430 guilders for five ships lent to the company in 1619: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 
4643.  
30 On postponement: NA 1.04.02 VOC Inv. No. 100, 20 September 1614, 10 October 1615. On the 
payment of interest on dividend claims: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 100, 4-17 August 1616 and fol. 396 
(August 1617), fol. 418 (20 October –  4 November 1617). In Enkhuizen dividends were postponed until 
1618, so the chamber had to pay interest over the arrears: Schalk 2010, p. 86-92. 
31 In 1617 the Zeeland chamber charged 30,092 guilders of interest payments on deposits to the account of 
the 12th fleet. Taking interest at 6.25 per cent yields a debt of more than 480,000 guilders. NA 1.04.02 
VOC, Inv. No. 13790, carta 102. 
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 Such large-scale borrowing required stiffening the corporate structure. Chambers 
preferred to borrow in Amsterdam, possibly through the Amsterdam chamber, since that 
was cheaper than doing it locally: the interest rate differential with Middelburg was two 
per cent to the latter’s disadvantage.32 The chambers’ directors contracted these debts 
personally and, as we have noted, they remained personally liable for them. This posed a 
serious bottleneck for borrowing the sums which the VOC needed for the planned 
offensive overseas. Unless backed up by some form of safeguard, directors would not 
likely shoulder the liabilities asked of them, nor could the other chambers fully exploit 
the facilities open to the Amsterdam chamber. Consequently in October and November 
1617 the Heren XVII took further steps in centralizing financial policy. First they 
resolved that henceforth all decisions to borrow would be theirs alone, so chambers 
needed prior permission to raise any money. To keep a check on this delegates would 
have to bring full details about their respective chambers’s financial position to every 
board meeting. At the same time the board transformed the chambers’ debt from a 
personal liability of the director responsible into a joint liability of all directors, who were 
made to sign a contract guaranteeing their chamber’s share in future debt pro rata of that 
chamber’s share in the company capital. Their successors would have to do the same.33  
 The contract shows the extent to which the VOC continued to suffer from the 
local particularism which had inspired the decentralized structure. After fifteen years in 
business together the six chambers still mistrusted each other’s financial policy 
                                                 
32 The Zeeland Chamber paid 7 and 7.5 per cent on deposits from two of its directors in September 1616. 
Four months later the Zeeland directors feared deposits could only be had at 8 per cent. In December 1617 
they expected to pay 7.5 to 8 per cent (NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11340, fol. 29r, 32, 46r, 48r). In June 
1617 the Amsterdam chamber resolved to pay 5 per cent on deposits from outsiders and 6 per cent on 
deposits from insiders (presumably, shareholders). On October 9th the target rate was set at 5 to 5.5 per cent 
for all deposits. NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 228, resolution 19 June 1617. 
33 NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 100, fol 422-424; cf. Van Dam, Beschrijvinge Vol. I, p. 233. 
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sufficiently to require the signatures of all present and future directors if they were to take 
on joint liabilities. Moreover, the contract demonstrates that the directors themselves 
conceived debt as a personal, and not a corporate, liability. Indeed, the Heren XVII 
apparently did not consider the VOC chambers as corporate bodies in the legal sense, 
able to conduct business in their own name, or else future directors would not have 
needed to sign as well. By the same token directors could not make the step towards 
claiming limited liability for themselves, since there existed no entity to assume full 
liability in their place.34 Consequently they made half a step and assumed joint full 
liability with the 1617 contract, freeing individual directors from risks which the 
company as a whole had to bear. 
 This provided a sufficiently strong basis to increase the VOC’s leverage. By May 
1620 the six chambers had debts of some 5 million guilders, of which 72 per cent had 
been raised by the Amsterdam chamber, and by March 1623 total debt had risen to over 8 
million guilders (Figure 4). Most of that money went into expanding operations, so when 
sales slowed down after a record year in 1618 the company found itself in a familiar 
predicament. Investment continued at a high level without as yet producing sales to 
match. As a result the company was burdened with a debt of 8 million guilders just when 
full accounts would finally have to be published and a new charter obtained.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
                                                 
34 In 1618 the Heren XVII discussed, but did not adopt, a draft contract conceived in Zeeland freeing the 
Middelburg directors from claims issuing from loans contracted by other chambers: NA 1.04.02 VOC 
Inv.No. 100, fol. 460, September 1618. 
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It thus became of the utmost importance not just to avoid publication, but also to reject 
the directors’ liability for debt, since the sum involved could easily bankrupt them all. 
The threat of disclosure loomed large indeed. Dissatisfied shareholders conducted a 
determined and unprecedented pamphlet campaign during 1621-1622, calling on the 
Estates General not to renew the charter without prior publication of its accounts and 
demanding firm new clauses to give them more power over company policy. Though the 
shareholders had the better arguments and the law on their side, the VOC got its way. In 
December 1622 it obtained a new charter to run from January 1623 for 21 years, having 
promised to let a committee of shareholders draft accounts for publication. Supported by 
the Estates of Holland the directors then sabotaged the committee’s work until after 
several years they gave up in frustration (De Jongh, 2011).  
 Formally the new charter changed nothing with regard to the managers’ personal 
liability for debt, its Clause 47 was identical to the old one. However, the clause had 
already been undermined by a subtle administrative change, possibly pioneered by the 
Middelburg chamber. Surviving bonds show directors guaranteeing debt in the customary 
way with person and goods in December 1621 and January 1622.35 However, by late July 
1622 the chamber had started using a substantially different type of bond. This was no 
longer issued and signed by the bewindhebbers or directors, but by the rekenmeesters or 
bookkeepers, and it no longer carried the signatories’ customary guarantee of person and 
goods.36 The new bonds appear to have raised investors’ eyebrows in Amsterdam, where 
the Middelburg bonds were issued. Who was liable for them: the Middelburg directors, 
                                                 
35 Three such bonds in NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 7064 (insurance contract), Film No. 4883, one bond 
from December 1621 and two from January 1622. 
36 One such bond dated 30 July 1622  in NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 7064 (insurance contract),  Film No. 
4883. Two more dated October and November 1622 in the Beinecke Library’s possession. 
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their officials signing the obligations, or the Amsterdam directors placing the debt? To 
end the confusion the Amsterdam chamber passed a resolution in October 1623.37 The 
directors rejected creditors’ claims that bond signatories were personally liable for the 
debt which it represented. However, the resolution continued, in order to quell any doubts 
the text of bonds would be rewritten to explicitly exclude a creditor’s recourse to the 
signatories’ person or possessions.  
 With this final, momentous step the directors incorporated limited liability in the 
VOC’s governance structure, one of several unintended consequences of the financial 
constraints within which the company operated. We do not know exactly what 
emboldened directors to take this step. Given their ongoing, acrimonious debate with 
disgruntled shareholders it was not a good moment to ruffle investors’ feathers, yet they 
did. Moreover, Middelburg had started issuing the new type of bonds six months before 
the Estates-General’s decision about the charter renewal, so, though the formal rejection 
of unlimited liability followed the company acquiring quasi permanence, the initial steps 
towards that position had been taken well before. Presumably the VOC directors felt 
entitled to do this following the 1621 verdict of the Supreme Court of Holland and 
Zeeland in an unrelated court case. Originating as far back as 1608, this case turned on 
the question whether or not the Amsterdam directors were personally liable for the 
consequences of fictitious share transfers performed by fraudulent clerks in the 
chamber’s books under their supervision. Overturning verdicts of lower courts, the 
Supreme Court finally rejected the claims of duped investors, ruling that the company 
                                                 
37 NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 228, Revolutions Chamber Amsterdam, 25 October 1623. 
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was liable, not its directors. 38 This suggests legal opinion had moved into the direction of 
according the VOC some form of legal personhood exhonerating directors of liability, 
and this may have inspired them to do the same for debt. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our analysis of the VOC’s first two decades in operation yields some surprising results. 
First of all, the company traded on a much bigger scale than its immediate predecessors, 
the early Asian ventures, but turnover, revenues, return on capital and return on assets 
were surprisingly low in comparison. This was a consequence of its policy of building a 
sufficiently strong overseas position, both to keep the competition at bay and to forge a 
monopoly in the spice trade. The financial structure underpinning that policy, revolving 
capital, was too weak to sustain it and locked the VOC in a continuous search to stretch 
available finance.  
Our analysis has also highlighted that, during its initial two decades, the VOC 
discovered a number of serious flaws in its original design: the company’s decentralised 
structure, the unwise reliance on circulating capital for fixed investment, the lack of a 
permanent capital, and the directors’ unlimited liability for debt. These flaws surfaced 
under the pressure of operational circumstances, which included the small chambers’ 
greater exposure to negative cash flows and the spice stocks inherited from preceding 
companies. However, the most important of those circumstances was a consequence of 
                                                 
38 NA 3.03.02 Hoge Raad, Inv. No. 714, Film No. 251, sentence 22 December 1621. For the Court of 
Holland’s earlier verdict dated 22 December 1616, see NA 192 Hof van Holland, Inv. Nr. 640. 
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the company’s own policy: to establish a commanding presence overseas required heavy 
investment and, above all, a scale of operations which drained revenues and forced 
directors to choose between keeping large stocks or ruining their own market.  
            Flaws and circumstances combined explain successive steps in the VOC’s 
corporate evolution: the harmonization of the chambers’ financial policy and its 
centralization in the hands of the Heren XVII from 1607, the 1612 acquisition of a 
permanent capital, the 1613 insurance contract, the 1617 mutual guarantee for debts 
contracted by directors, the issuing of bonds from other chambers by Amsterdam, and 
finally the 1623 rejection of directors’ liability for company debt. Consequently, having 
acquired two key features of the modern corporation, that is to say the split between 
ownership and management and transferable shares, from the outset, the VOC obtained 
three more, i.e. a permanent capital, limited liability for directors and by extension legal 
personhood, step-by-step over a period of some twenty years. Thus the five features did 
not come as a package, as a coherent logical set. Nor did the adoption of one 
automatically lead to the adoption of the others in a process of natural legal evolution 
from simple partnerships via various forms of Roman law-based corporations to joint-
stock limited liability companies. Nor were the features a natural response to the 
challenges of the intercontinental trade, but the result of friction between financial 
constraints and operational demands. Since the constraints were determined by outside 
shareholders and creditors, the driving force behind the VOC’s corporate evolution was 
ultimately its need to raise outside finance.  
            If we accept this, we have to consider two wider implications. First, the long 
debate about the exact legal origins of modern corporations misses a vital point. The 
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process of corporate evolution was no doubt shaped by early modern businessmen and 
lawyers borrowing or modifying concepts from then-current legal and business practice 
to suit their needs. But the process derived its logic and driving force from the demands 
of outside finance, and not from a legal system. Tracing the exact antecedents of this or 
that corporate feature back in Roman law or common law makes sense only if we keep in 
mind that it was adopted or adapted for economic reasons, not legal ones. To borrow a 
term from design theory: legal form followed economic function, and not the other way 
around. The VOC’s case does highlight, though, one important precondition for processes 
of institutional change such as this, namely freedom of contract, the freedom to choose 
the best solution from a range of alternatives. Having this enabled the VOC to swap the 
insurance contract for something better, the mutual guarantee, and then to improve on 
that by claiming directors’ limited liability. By contrast, the EIC did not possess it, 
forcing the company to continue relying on the complicated and comparatively expensive 
insurance contracts until fundamental institutional changes during 1650s. 
Second, we need to rethink current conceptions about the supposed superiority of 
Western legal constructs such as the corporation in establishing European dominance. For 
the corporation was really the Western solution to a specific Western problem, i.e. the 
need to attract outside finance through the market. Consequently societies with 
alternative ways of mobilizing resources, for instance through kinship or clan ties, did not 
develop similar corporations – but the point is really, to what extent could these 
alternative ties provide effective substitutes for Western institutions? There is no reason 
to suppose such ties a priori inferior to market-based formal legal constructs in 
facilitating key economic functions such as searching, contracting, monitoring, and 
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enforcing. Indeed, they may have been superior, but as long as we keep looking for 
Western-style corporations we will not find business enterprises organized on the basis of 
such ties, nor will we be able to understand the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative ways of organizing business compared to Western solutions. In short, we need 
to retrain our sights and the VOC example suggests that a good way to start is to examine 
the logic of a given concern’s financial structure.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Debt raised by directors of the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, August 1602-
May 1608 
 
Source: NA. 1.04.02 Inv. No. 7162, carta 72-302 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average duration (in days) of return voyages to Asia and the number of ships 
that stayed there, per year of departure from Dutch Republic 
 
Source: Bruijn et al (1987); the calculated duration does not include the ships remaining in Asia. 
0
100.000
200.000
300.000
400.000
500.000
600.000
Aug
1602
Dec
1602
Apr
1603
Aug
1603
Dec
1603
Apr
1604
Aug
1604
Dec
1604
Apr
1605
Aug
1605
Dec
1605
Apr
1606
Aug
1606
Dec
1606
Apr
1607
Aug
1607
Dec
1607
Apr
1608
Deposits Companies
Private Deposits
0
300
600
900
1200
1500
1800
2100
15
95
15
96
15
97
15
98
15
99
16
00
16
01
16
02
16
03
16
04
16
05
16
06
16
07
16
08
16
09
16
10
16
11
16
12
16
13
16
14
16
15
16
16
16
17
16
18
16
19
16
20
16
21
16
22
16
23
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Ships Stayed in Asia
Duration Return Voyage
37 
 
Figure 3: Estimated annual sales revenues and expenditure on the equipment of VOC 
fleets, 1602-1622. 
 
Source: Appendix 1 
 
 
Figure 4: Debt Outstanding of the VOC Chambers, 1620-1623 
 
Source: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 100, Resolutions Heren XVII, fol. 550-551, 591, 599, 650 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: VOC Zeeland, Bills paid for Returned Ships, December 1606- July 1611 
     
Period Wages Other Costs Commission Total 
     
Dec 1606 – Jul 1608 137,053 22,267 32,540 191,860 
Aug 1608 – Feb 1609 14,396 9,425 0 23,821 
Mar 1609 – Aug 1609 39,406 1,700 17,862 58,968 
Sep 1609 – Feb 1610 42,513 4,783 0 47,296 
Mar 1610 – Aug 1610 34,744 9,616 0 44,360 
Sep 1610 – Jul 1611 24,492 44,126 0 68,618 
     
Total 292,604 91,917 50,402 434,923 
     
Source: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, carta 61, 62, 75, 97, 119-120, 137-139 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The estimated annual cost of the VOC’s military effort in Asia, 1609 
  
Expenses Amount 
  
soldiers 120,000 
Sailors 90,000 
provisions 100,000 
fortifications 50,000 
depreciation 60,000 
Total 420,000 
  
Source: Van Dam (1927) Vol. 1.2, p. 525-526 
 
 
Table 3: Dividends in kind paid to the shareholders of the Zeeland Chamber, 1609-1612 
     
Period Pepper Mace Nutmeg Total 
     
Mar 1609 – Aug 1609 19,647 0 0 19,647 
Sep 1609 – Feb 1610 63,532 0 0 63,532 
Mar 1610 – Aug 1610 1,630 0 0 1,630 
Sep 1610 – Jul 1611 115,386 10,213 0 125,598 
Aug 1611 – Jul 1612 94,996 43,606 116,072 254,674 
Sep 1612 – Nov 1612 0 0 36,133 36,133 
     
Total 295,191 53,818 152,205 501,214 
     
Source: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, Copieboek rekeningen Zeeland  
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Appendix 1 
 
The Finances of the VOC, 1602-1623  
 
 
 
 
As explained in the main text, so as to better understand how the VOC evolved as a 
corporation we collected and, where necessary, reconstructed the financial data from the 
company’s first two decades. Until now scholars have accepted De Korte’s expert 
opinion (De Korte 1983/2000), that the scarcity of administrative data for the period up to 
1640 prevents a reconstruction of annual income and expenditure, let alone for details 
such as financial resources, operating costs, and profitability. According to us there is a 
way out, however, at least for the years 1602-1623. We started by estimating the cash 
flow. This can be done by combining the data on outward and inward shipping collected 
by Bruijn et al. (1987) with the cost of equipments and revenues from sales as recorded in 
surviving ledgers of individual chambers on one hand, and on the other with information 
from financial reports submitted by the Zeeland chamber to the general board, the Heren 
XVII, between 1608 and 1612. We did this assuming that data on individual ships or 
chambers may be made to stand for the company as a whole because of the VOC’s 
practice to allocate costs and revenues, evenly to its six chambers, each according to their 
share in the original capital: Amsterdam 50 per cent, Zeeland 25 per cent, Rotterdam, 
Delft, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen 6.25 per cent each. These shares also served as the basis for 
calculating the directors’ income, a percentage of fitting costs and sales revenues, so they 
saw to it that their chamber got its due. Since accounts for successive outward fleets were 
kept separate, fitting costs or revenues per ton from one chamber’s ship may therefore be 
taken as a guide for the other ships in that same fleet. Wherever possible we have refined 
the cash flow estimates with occasionally available data on total fleet size at a given 
moment, cargoes of individual ships, short-term debt, the cost of refitting returned ships, 
and dividend payments to shareholders.  
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EQUIPMENTS 
 
The fourteen ships sent out in 1602 under Van Warwijck were administered by the VOC, 
but they belonged to the shareholders in one of the company’s forerunners. The 
company’s own first three fleets sailed in 1603, 1605 and 1606 and were funded by 
shareholders’ subscriptions. Van Dam (1977) and surviving accounts of the chambers of 
Zeeland and Enkhuizen yield the fitting costs of all chambers except Hoorn.39 Based on 
the average costs of 31 ships of the five chambers we estimate the value of the three ships 
Hoorn contributed to the first three fleets, plus the one ship which sailed from 
Amsterdam in 1604. Total cost of the 1607 fleet can be estimated by extrapolating the 
known costs of ten ships from Amsterdam and Zeeland to the four ships equipped by 
Rotterdam, Hoorn, and Delft.40  
During 1608 and 1609 a total of only three small ships (250, 80, and 80 tons) 
sailed for Asia from Amsterdam. We do not know their cost. Based on the average value 
for all ships sailing between 1603 and 1607 (approximately 350 guilders per ton) the 
three ships’ cost may have totalled 143,500 guilders. In 1610 Enkhuizen equipped two 
small ships (100 and 120 tons) for 74,319 guilders.41 Combining this information, we 
estimate the total value of the two ships in 1608 at 100,000 guilders, and that of the ship 
in 1609 at 50,000 guilders. 
We know the value of five of the nine ships of Pieter Both’s fleet of 1610, two 
from Enkhuizen and three from Zeeland, but not of the four from Amsterdam. The 
equipment cost of the two Enkhuizen ships was relatively low because they sailed 
without silver, so we have used the average value of the three Zeeland ships as proxy for 
                                                 
39 Enkhuizen: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 14854-I, fol. 169; inlaid sheaf of papers, fol. 595. Zeeland: NA 
1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, carta 62 and Inv. No. 13784, carta 141-142. Amsterdam: De Korte, 
Jaarlijkse, p. 10. Delft and Rotterdam: Van Dam, Beschrijvinge, Vol. 1.1, p. 224. 
40 Zeeland: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, carta 62, Inv. No. 13784, carta 141-142. Amsterdam: De 
Korte, Jaarlijkse, p. 10. In July 1608 the Zeeland Chamber registered 32,540 guilders’ worth of 
commission fees ‘for the fourth equipment paid to the other chambers’: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, 
carta 59-60. At the usual 1 per cent rate these fees would imply the six chambers spending a total of 3.25 
million guilders on the fourth fleet, that is to say about 600,000 guilders more than our estimate. We cannot 
account for this difference. 
41 NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 14854-I, fol. 169. 
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the value of the four ships from Amsterdam, which undoubtedly carried silver as well.42 
As for the small fleet sailing under Brouwer in 1610/11, the Zeeland ship in it had cost 
212,870 guilders and we assume the two Amsterdam ships to have cost the same. In 1611 
Amsterdam and Enkhuizen dispatched one ship each under Reael. The ‘Bantam’ from 
Enkhuizen probably cost 162,195 guilders.43 We assume the ship from Amsterdam to 
have cost the same as the 1610/1611 Zeeland ship, i.e. 212, 870 guilders.44 
In September 1612 Zeeland recorded the contribution of each chamber to the 
seventh fleet of 14 ships under Blok during 1611/12: Amsterdam 1.8 million guilders, 
Zeeland 426,374 guilders, Rotterdam 227,303 guilders, and Enkhuizen 321,857 
guilders.45 Zeeland’s detailed account lacks a separate entry for two more ships sailing 
from Amsterdam under Coen in May 1612, so we assume their cost to have been 
included in the total for the seventh fleet. 
We estimate the value of the fleets of 1613 and 1614 from a VOC request for 
financial support submitted to the Estates General in 1614. The company argued that 
recent fleets had averaged 10 to 12 ships for a total value of 1.8 to 2 million guilders per 
fleet. These fleets were said to have carried between 500,000 to 600,000 guilders’ worth 
of silver.46 On the basis of these reported figures we set the value of each fleet at 2 
million guilders. To estimate the cost of the five-ship fleet of 1615 we extrapolate the 
figure for the two Zeeland ships (393,000 guilders) to yield a total of 984,000 guilders, 
which tallies with the value of the two previous fleets. 47  
The costs of the three fleets sailing in 1616 and 1617 plus three ships setting out 
early in 1618 can be estimated by extrapolating the value of four ships from Zeeland and 
                                                 
42 The two ships from Enkhuizen carried 2,820 guilders in silver: NA 1.04.02 VOC, I Inv. No. 14854-I, fol. 
169. Zeeland reported that admiral Both’s fleet, which included the two Enkhuizen ships, carried a total of 
709,000 guilders, and the five ships  of Brouwer and Reael (1610-1611), 601,600 guilders: NA 1.04.02 
VOC, Inv. No. 11349, accounts Zeeland, Carta 142. 
43 Calculating commission fees in 1612, Zeeland recorded a total cost of 321,857 for the Patania from 
Enkhuizen (which sailed under Blok in 1612), but subtracted 162,195 guiders for expenses during 1611. An 
Enkhuizen ledger has the same amount of 321,857 guilders for the Bantam and Patania combined. Taken 
together this suggests that the Bantam had cost 162,195 guilders and the Patania 159,661 guilders. 
44 Check: silvervalue Bantam from Enkhuizen: if it is zero or close to zero estimate of silver in ships from 
other chambers needs to be adjusted. 
45 NA. 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No.  11349, accounts Zeeland, Carta 127. 
46 Van Dam, Beschrijvinge, Vol. 1.2, p. 524. The one Enkhuizen ship whose exact value we know had cost 
about 100,000 guilders, much lower than the value per ship in the VOC’s figure. However, financial 
constraints had forced Enkhuizen to dispatch its ship without any silver (Schalk 2010). 
47 The two ships from Isaac Lemaire’s Austraelsche Compagnie, Eendracht and Hoorn, have of course 
been  excluded from our calculations for 1615, since they did not belong to the VOC.  
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two from Enkhuizen in these expeditions, which averaged 307,243 guilders. This figure 
was much higher than before, managers in Asia having demanded much more silver to be 
sent, so each of these three fleets carried at least double the amount of silver.48  
In December 1620 the Amsterdam chamber’s directors wrote to Jan Pietersz Coen 
that two fleets, one of 16 ships sailing between December 1618 and May 1619, and one 
of 23 ships which left between December 1619 and June 1620, including a yacht which 
had sailed from Amsterdam in September 1619, had cost a total of 90 chests of gold or 9 
million guilders. The second one had cost 4.6 million guilders, so the first one must have 
cost 4.4 million.49 Surviving accounts from Zeeland and Enkhuizen enable us to estimate 
the share of individual chambers in these two fleets. The five ships which Zeeland and 
Enkhuizen had contributed to the 1618/19 fleet had cost 1.8 million guilders, so we 
divide the remaining 2.6. million guilders between the remaining 11 ships. For the 
1619/20 fleet we follow the same procedure. Two Zeeland ships had cost 600,000 
guilders, leaving 4 million guilders to be spread evenly over the other nineteen ships.  
In the same December 1620 letter the Amsterdam directors gave a total value of 
the 15-ship fleet sailing between December 1620 and May 1621 as 3.6 million guilders, 
including 1,125,000 guilders worth of silver. Three months later the Heren XVII wrote 
that another 13 chests of silver (260,000 guilders) would be shipped with this fleet, 
raising the total to 3,860,000 guilders.50 The Zeeland accounts show this chamber’s four 
ships to have cost 790,000 guilders, so again we divide the remaining, approximately 3 
million guilders by the other 11 ships.  
We have few details about the two remaining fleets during the company’s initial 
charter period. The first one of twelve ships sailed during November and December 
1621, preceded by two Amsterdam yachts departing on the 1st of October. According to 
the Heren XVII they had ‘exerted themselves’ (ons selven geeforceert) to send 800,000 
Spanish pieces of eight (realen) or no less than 2 million guilders with this fleet.51 
Zeeland’s ship had cost 175,000 guilders without its silver cargo and we assume the same 
                                                 
48 (Coen, Bescheiden IV***, DAS***). 
49 Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 476. 
50 Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 507. 
51 Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 519. 
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amount for each of the other ships, bringing the total value of the fleet to 4 million 
guilders.  
The final one was a small fleet of seven ships sailing during December 1622 and 
January 1623, Rotterdam having dispatched an additional yacht in April 1622. We have 
no detailed information on the cost of this equipment. However, in April 1622 the Heren 
XVII warned their overseas commander Coen that financial resources were stretched, so 
future fleets would be smaller. We therefore estimate the value of each of the ships in this 
fleet, including the Rotterdam yacht, at 250,000 guilders, i.e. the average value of the 
ships sailing during 1625, for which we have the exact cost.52  
                                                 
52 NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 13771: Amsterdam, 5 ships, 1,319,338 guilders; Zeeland, 3 ships, 798, 645 
guilders; Delft, one ship, 213,852 guilders , Enkhuizen, one ship, 192,988 guilders. 
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Year Ships Admiral Ship Names Tonnage Chamber Total  Silver % 
         
1595-1602 80   Early companies 29,450   8,209,438     
         
1603 2 v.d. Hagen   Westfriesland, Enkhuizen 1,000 Enkhuizen 320,112   
1603 2 v.d. Hagen   Dordrecht, Zeelandia 1,400 Zeeland 429,276 150,000 35% 
1603 6 v.d. Hagen   Amsterdam, Delft, Duifje, Gelderland, Hof van Holland, Geünieerde Provinciën 2,620 Amsterdam 993,058 358,140 36% 
1603 2 v.d. Hagen   Hoorn, Medemblik 950 Hoorn 346,943   
         
1604 1  Gouda 260 Amsterdam 173,472   
         
1605 2 Matelieff Amsterdam, Kleine Zon 920 Zeeland 268,787   
1605 7 Matelieff Witte Leeuw, Mauritius, Zwarte Leeuw, Nassau, Oranje, Grote Zon 4,000 Amsterdam 1,437,682 606,300 42% 
1605 1 Matelieff Erasmus 540 Rotterdam 231,567   
1605 2 Matelieff Eendracht, Geunieerde Provintien 640 Delft 166,217   
         
1606 3 v.Caerden   Ter Veere, Walcheren, Zierikzee 2,160 Zeeland 706,023   
1606 1 v.Caerden   Patania 340 Enkhuizen 106,423   
1606 5 v.Caerden   Banda, Bantam, Ceylon, Gelderland, Gouda 2,400 Amsterdam 830,146 340,750 41% 
1606 1 v.Caerden   China 420 Hoorn 173,472   
         
1607 7 Verhoef Gelderland, Amsterdam, Arend, Hollandia, Rode Leeuw met Pijlen, Pauw, Geünieerde Provinciën 3,580 Amsterdam 1,295,905 526,900 41% 
1607 3 Verhoef Middelburg, Valk, Zeelandia 1,440 Zeeland 570,055 277,757 49% 
1607 2 Verhoef Griffioen, Rotterdam 940 Rotterdam 375,147 185,171 49% 
1607 1 Verhoef Delft 800 Delft 187,574 92,586 49% 
1607 1 Verhoef Hoorn 700 Hoorn 187,574 92,586 49% 
         
1603-1607 49     25,110   8,799,433     
         
1608 2  Hoop, Medemblik 330 Amsterdam 100,000   
         
1609 1  Halve Maan 80 Amsterdam 50000   
         
1610 4 Both Ceylon, Witte Leeuw, Zwarte Leeuw, Wapen van Amsterdam 2,280 Amsterdam 748,551   
1610 3 Both Ter Goes, Oranje, Vlissingen 1,540 Zeeland 561,413 302,649 54% 
1610 2 Both Hasewint, Brack 220 Enkhuizen 74,319 2,820 4% 
         
1610/11 2 Brouwer Gouda, Rode Leeuw met de Pijlen 660 Amsterdam 425,739   
1611 1 Brouwer Ter Veere 700 Zeeland 212,870 120,320 57% 
         
1611 1 Reael Banda   800 Amsterdam 212,870   
1611 1 Reael Bantam 900 Enkhuizen 162,195 120,320 74% 
         
1611/12 
 
11 
 
Blok 
 
Halve Maan, Grote Aeolus, Ceylon, Duifje, Gelderland, Groene Leeuw, Rode Leeuw, Grote Maan, 
Ster, Zon, Oranje 3,870 Amsterdam 1,800,862   
1611/12 1 Blok Rotterdam 800 Rotterdam 227,303   
1611/12 1 Blok Patania 340 Enkhuizen 159,661   
1611/12 1 Blok Zeelandia 500 Zeeland 426,374   
1611/12 2  Hoop, Geunieerde Provincien 1,200 Amsterdam    
         
1608-1612 33     14,220   5,162,156     
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1613 2 v. Surck Middelburg, Zeelandia 1,600 Zeeland 333,333   
1613 2 v.d Zande Arend, Witte Valk 660 Amsterdam 333,333   
1613 1 v.d Zande Hoorn 700 Hoorn 166,667   
1613 4 v.d. Haghen Wapen van Amsterdam, Hollandia, Mauritius, Nassau 2,900 Amsterdam 666,667   
1613 1  Neptunus 220 Amsterdam 166,667   
1613 1  Kleine Aeolus 240 Rotterdam 166,667   
1613 1  Delft 800 Delft 166,667   
         
1614 1  Hert 280 Rotterdam 135,256   
         
1614 2 Stoop Vlissingen, Walcheren 1,200 Zeeland 270,511   
1614 1 Stoop Wapen van Amsterdam 800 Amsterdam 135,256   
1614 1 Stoop Engel 600 Delft 135,256   
1614 1 Stoop Enckhuysen 500 Enkhuizen 106,423 0 0% 
1614 1 Stoop Oranjeboom 360 Hoorn 135,256   
         
1614 1 Spilbergen Grote Aeolus (jacht) 320 Zeeland 135,256   
1614 4 Spilbergen Jager, Grote Maan, Meeuwtje, Grote Zon 1,400 Amsterdam 541,022   
1614 1 Spilbergen Morgenster 300 Rotterdam 135,256   
         
1614 2  Witte Beer, Zwarte Beer 620 Amsterdam 270,511   
         
1615 2  Dolfijn (jacht), ter Veere 980 Zeeland 393,761 170,160 43% 
1615 2  Bergerboot, Zwarte Leeuw 880 Amsterdam 393,761   
1615 1  Galiasse 280 Hoorn 196,881   
         
1616 1  Wapen van Zeeland 700 Zeeland 382,401 173,280 45% 
1616 2  Eendracht, Trouw 1,200 Amsterdam 614,487 345,600 56% 
1616 1  Nieuw Bantam 800 Enkhuizen 222,271 96,000 43% 
1616 1  Gouden Leeuw 550 Rotterdam 307,243 172,800 56% 
1616 2  Westfriesland, Oranjeboom 1,160 Hoorn 614,487 163,200 27% 
1616 1  Hert 280 Delft 307,243 115,200 37% 
         
1617 1  Zierikzee 800 Zeeland 557,550 288,480 52% 
1617 1  Postpeerdt 300 Enkhuizen 201,960 115,200 57% 
1617 6  Eenhoorn, Goede Fortuin, Groene Leeuw, Vosje, Witte Beer, Tijger 1,660 Amsterdam 1,843,461 ,  
         
1617 2  Dolfijn (jacht), Ter Tholen (jacht) 660 Zeeland 479,279 297,960 62% 
1617 5  Witte Beer, Tijger, Zwarte Beer, Zeewolf, Mauritius 1,920 Amsterdam 1,536,217 376,275 24% 
1618 1  Delft 800 Delft 307,243 75,255 24% 
1618 1  Wapen van Haarlem 360 Amsterdam 307,243 75,255 24% 
1618 1  Hert 280 Rotterdam 307,243 75,255 24% 
         
1613-1618 58     27,110   12,972,733     
         
1618/19 4 De Houtman Westfriesland, Wapen van Zeeland, Ter Tholen, Walcheren 2,500 Zeeland 1,438,020 385,920 27% 
1618/19 1 De Houtman Enckhuysen 500 Enkhuizen 348,348 205,140 59% 
1618/19 1 De Houtman Hoorn 700 Hoorn 237,603   
1618/19 1 De Houtman Oranjeboom 360 Rotterdam 237,603   
1618/19 
 
9 
 
De Houtman 
 
Dordrecht, Eenhoorn, Goede Hoop, Postpaard, Zeelandia, Amsterdam, Witte Beer, Eendracht, 
Goede Fortuin 5,300 Amsterdam 2,138,426   
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1619/20 2 Baccum Zierikzee, Middelburg 1,500 Zeeland 613,980 117,422 19% 
1619/20 
 
13 
 
Baccum 
 
Vrede, Weesp, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Bruinvis, Eenhoorn, Heilbot; Hollandia, Leiden, 
Mauritius, Schoonhoven, Groningen, Muiden 6,610 Amsterdam 2,467,536   
1619/20 3 Baccum Purmerend, Medemblik, Wapen van Hoorn 1,100 Hoorn 569,431   
1619/20 2 Baccum Alkmaar, Wapen van Enkhuizen 1,300 Enkhuizen 379,621   
1619/20 2 Baccum Delft, Oranje 1,160 Rotterdam 379,621   
1619/20 1 Baccum Schiedam 300 Delft 189,810   
         
1620/21 4  Westfriesland, Arnemuiden, Oranjeboom (jacht), Westkapelle (jacht) 1,400 Zeeland 790,010 381,331 48% 
1620/21 7  Zwarte beer, Gouda, Naarden, Dordrecht, Haan, Valk, Leeuwin 2,570 Amsterdam 1,953,630   
1620/21 1  Wapen van Delft 700 Delft 279,090   
1620/21 1  Haring 180 Enkhuizen 279,090   
1620/21 1  Hazewind 120 Hoorn 279,090   
1620/21 1  Gouden Leeuw 550 Rotterdam 279,090   
         
1621 1  Walcheren 600 Zeeland 438,385 262,104 60% 
1621 1  Wapen van Rotterdam 700 Rotterdam 332,991   
1621 1  Delfshaven 400 Delft 332,991   
1621 6  Gorkum, Heusden, Mauritius, Woerden, Witte Beer, Vrede 2,240 Amsterdam 1,997,943   
1621 2  Edam, Wapen van Hoorn 900 Hoorn 665,981   
1621 1  Monnikendam 300 Enkhuizen 332,991   
         
1622/23 1  Middelburg 700 Zeeland 250,000   
1622/23 1  Kleine Erasmus 240 Rotterdam 250,000   
1622/23 2  Makreel, Wapen van Enkhuizen 1,000 Enkhuizen 500,000   
1622/23 2  Leiden, Schoonhoven, Naarden 1,280 Amsterdam  500,000   
1622/23 1  Medemblik 300 Hoorn 250,000   
         
         
1618-1622 73     35,510   18,711,281     
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SALES 
 
To estimate the VOC’s annual sales for the period 1602-1622 we draw on a number of 
sources. We base our estimates of the company’s sales during 1602-1612 on accounts 
prepared by the Zeeland chamber for the Heren XVII from July 1608 onwards.53 In them 
the Zeeland directors noted that, on 13 October 1607, the Heren XVII had calculated their 
share in overall sales commission at 6,500 guilders. Directors received one per cent 
commission on sales, of which Zeeland received 25 per cent, so the VOC total sales until 
October 1607 must have amounted to 2.6 million guilders.54 Of this total Zeeland itself 
had sold very little. By July 1608, that is to say, nine months after calculating the 
commission fees, the chamber had sold no more than 200,000 guilders worth of pepper, 
cloves, and other colonial imports (Table A).  
 
 
Table A, Sales of the Chamber Zeeland, December 1606 – November 1612 
       
Period pepper mace cloves nutmeg Other Total 
       
December 1606 - July 1608 116,468  58,475  28,930 203,873 
August 1608 - February 1609 68,336    6,831 75,166 
March 1609 – August 1609 26,196    2,025 28,221 
September 1609 – February 1610 85,731 12,137 6,094 49,248 9,487 162,697 
March 1610 – August 1610 138,947  9,976 23,446 10,000 182,369 
September 1610 - July 1611 440,366 10,718 660 61,387 42,935 556,066 
August 1611 - June 1612 747,131 44,394 172,645 130,962 28,069 1,123,200 
July 1612 - November 1612 55,066 11,928 180,455 36,133 28,564 312,145 
       
Total 1,678,242 79,177 428,305 301,176 156,840 2,643,739 
       
Source: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, carta 5v, 59-62, 75, 97 
 
 
Why did Zeeland sell so little for the VOC? Presumably the chamber had to sell old stock 
first, for instance the spices imported by the three Zeeland ships in the 1602 Van 
Warwijck fleet, which had returned to Middelburg during 1605 and 1606.55 Moreover, 
the volume of spices received by Zeeland was lower than the capacity of ships sent out 
would suggest. In 1608 the Zeeland directors booked receipts of 408,722 guilders for 
                                                 
53 NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, “Rekeningen ende bewijsen die de caemer van Middelburch is doende 
aende respective Caemeren van alle de vercochte goederen gecommen mette schepen Zeelandt, Dordrecht, 
ende Amsterdam voor rekeninge vande 10-jarige, anno 1608” 
54 Carta *** 
55 During 1605-1607, the company of 14 ships which had sailed in 1602 could pay out 1,651,488 guilders 
to shareholders from sales revenues of goods from a captured Portuguese vessel: Van Dam, Beschrijvinge 
Vol. 1.1., p. 17-19; Vol. 1.2, p. 485. Check: can we reconstruct exact sales from Zeeland reports?  
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freight carried ‘for other companies’ by the ships Zeeland, Dordrecht, and Amsterdam, 
which had returned respectively during 1606, 1607, and 1608.56  
In any case, the bulk of the company’s 2.6 million guilder total sales up to 
October 1607 was done by Amsterdam, largely because that chamber received most of 
the returns: five of its ships came back during this period, against two for Zeeland and a 
single one for Hoorn. The other three chambers lost ships and therefore did not receive 
any spices until 1608 (Delft), 1610 (Enkhuizen) or even 1611 (Rotterdam). Since Zeeland 
sold less than 200,000 guilders’ worth of spices of its own up to July 1608, sales by 
Amsterdam and Hoorn between May 1605 and November 1607 must have amounted to 
2.4 million guilders.  
In August 1609 the Zeeland chamber recorded a payment of 17,862 guilders for 
‘commission fees for traded [goods] to the respective chamber, calculated until the last 
day of February 1609’. Since the chamber’s previous recording of commission fees paid 
for sales dated from November 1607, we assume, applying the same gauge used above, 
sales of 1,786,200 guilders between December 1607 and February 1609. Zeeland sold 
only an estimated 171,000 guilders’ worth of spices during this period, so the other three 
chambers with return cargoes in 1608, that is to say three ships for Amsterdam, one each 
for Hoorn and for Delft, must have sold over 1.6 million guilders’ worth of spices, 
averaging approximately 320,000 guilders per ship. 
 For the period March 1609 – July 1611 we have no references to fees earned, so 
we need to estimate VOC sales in another way. We have done this in two steps. We first 
take the value of the cargo of three three return ships, two to Zeeland and one, the first 
one, to Enkhuizen. Combining recorded sales from the two Zeeland ships, the Ter Veere 
and the Zeelandia, with the remaining stock of spices in Zeeland in July 1611, we 
calculate that the cargo of these two ships was worth 1,633,535 guilders (cf. infra). 
Recorded sales of spices from the Patania, the first ever ship returning to Enkhuizen in 
1610, show a total cargo worth 1,050,007 guilders. Six more ships returned between 
March 1609 and July 1611, all to Amsterdam; if we value their cargo at 895,000 guilders, 
the average of these three ships, we get an estimated total value of VOC return cargoes of 
8,055,000 guilders.  
                                                 
56 NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, carta 20, 59, 60. 
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 We then estimate sales from these cargoes. Only a small part appears to have sold 
during the period under consideration. As late as 1610 the VOC directors still sold pepper 
mostly from stocks delivered by Van Warwijck’s 1602 fleet, and only a small volume of 
its own.57 Moreover, the total of 125 per cent dividend in kind, against only 7.5 per cent 
in cash, awarded to shareholders by the Heren XVII in April and November 1610 
suggests a need to clear overstocks.  
 
Table B, Sales of goods from different ships returning to Zeeland between December 
1606 and November 1612. 
           
 Unknown Dordrecht  
Zeeland 
#1 Amsterdam  
Ter  
Veere 
Zeeland 
#2 oranje Middelburg 
Other 
chambers Total 
           
           
Dec 06 – July 08 0 81,869 122,005 0 0 0 0 0 0 203,874 
Aug 08 – Feb 09 1,029 0 73,971 166 0 0 0 0 0 75,166 
Mar 09 – Aug 09 2,025 0 0 26,196 0 0 0 0 0 28,221 
Sep 09 – Feb 10 1,023 0 0 84,709 76,966 0 0 0 0 162,697 
Mar 10 – Aug 10 2,174 0 0 136,774 43,422 0 0 0 0 182,369 
Sep 10 – Jul 11 5,237 0 0 24 77,167 473,640 0 0 0 556,067 
Aug 11 – Sep 12 0 0 0 0 142,283 8,709 535,890 0 433,687 1,120,570 
Sep 12 – Nov 12 0 0 0 0 18,363 2,818 53,266 199,128 38,571 312,145 
           
Total 11,487 81,869 195,976 247,868 358,201 485,167 589,156 199,128 472,258 2,641,110 
           
Source: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, carta 59-62, 81, 97. 
 
 
Zeeland data enable us to estimate how much of the cargoes returning between March 
1609 and July 1611 was sold (Table B). The Zeeland Chamber recorded spice sales, 
mostly pepper, worth 247,702 guilders from the Amsterdam and 671,195 guilders from 
the Ter Veere and the Zeelandia. At the end of this period, in July 1611, the stock of 
spices from the last two ships was valued at 962,340 guilders.58 In other words, almost 60 
per cent of the spices imported from Asia remained unsold. However, actual sales were 
lower still. More than half of the deliveries booked as sales, spices from the Amsterdam 
included, were really given away as dividends in kind (22.4 per cent) and spices supplied 
                                                 
57 Van Dam, Beschrijvinge Vol. 1.2, 149.  
58 In July 1611 the Zeeland directors recorded a total stock of 962,340 guilders in July 1611, consisting 
primarily of nutmeg and mace. NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, carta 98. The Chamber’s detailed sales 
records from December 1606 onwards suggest that the cargoes of the Dordrecht (1606) and Zeeland (1607) 
had sold out already by August 1608. Sales from the Amsterdam (1608) had stopped by September, and as 
this ship’s cargo mainly consisted of pepper for the VOC and unspecified goods for ‘other companies’, it is 
unlikely that spices from the Amsterdam were sold in 1611: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, carta 59-62, 
81, 97. 
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to other chambers for them to use as dividends in kind (34 per cent).59 Taking this into 
account, Zeeland sold only 17.5 per cent of its imports between March 1609 and July 
1611.60  
At first sight the Enkhuizen chamber did better. Until July 1611 it recorded sales 
of 927,126 guilders from the Patania, i.e. 90 per cent of the total cargo. Still, over a third 
of these ‘sales’ (35.4 per cent) consisted of deliveries of cloves to other chambers for 
dividend payments, while an unknown part of the remaining ‘sales’ likely consisted of 
dividends in kind, as in Zeeland. Combining the available data for Zeeland and 
Enkhuizen, we estimate that the VOC sold only 25 per cent of the return cargoes arriving 
in the Republic between March 1609 and July 1611. From the timing of the Zeeland 
sales, we also estimate that two-thirds of the sales during this period were transacted 
between September 1610 and July 1611. 
We have more information about subsequent sales. A calculation of commission 
fees by the Zeeland chamber in September 1612 details sales reported by all six chambers 
for July 1611 to early September 1612 (Table C). This report puts total turnover at 5.7 
million guilders, but this figure probably includes the back pay and other costs which 
chambers incurred over returned ships during these months. We put these costs at 85,000 
guilders per ship for the six ships returning during the summer of 1611, resulting in actual 
sales revenues of 5.2 million guilders, or 385,000 guilders per month, for the period July 
1611-early September 1612.   
                                                 
59 In August 1609 and February 1610 pepper from the ship Amsterdam worth 110,903 guilders was 
delivered to Zeeland shareholders. One quarter of that was considered a sale, whereas three quarters or 
83,177 guilders’ worth represented an advance on expected dividends. In addition Zeeland delivered pepper 
and mace for an amount of 122,870 guilders to its shareholders plus 315,254 guilders’ worth of pepper to 
other chambers for them to pay out to their shareholders.  
60  
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Table C, Sales revenues based on commissions paid to the directors of the six VOC 
chambers, July 1611 - September 1612 
   
Chamber Value Share 
   
Amsterdam 2,935,455 51.4% 
Zeeland 998,050 17.5% 
Enkhuizen 10,543 0.2% 
Rotterdam 505,068 8.9% 
Delft 776,582 13.6% 
Hoorn 479,876 8.4% 
   
Total 5,705,573 100.0% 
   
Source: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, Copieboek rekeningen Zeeland, Carta*** 
 
 
Most of the spices sold between August 1611 and September 1612, but not all, came 
from six ships arriving at the beginning of this period. The Ceylon returned to 
Amsterdam with its own cargo plus that of the Erasmus, equipped by Rotterdam in 1605 
and shipwrecked at Mauritius in November 1608. This combined cargo was valued at 
1,082,854 guilders. The Geunieerde Provincien, also from Amsterdam, carried goods 
worth 572,000 guilders. The Hoorn and Rotterdam, named after their respective 
chambers, returned home with 559,488 and 802,106 guilders’ worth respectively.61 The 
Oranje from Zeeland probably carried 589,000 guilders’ worth of merchandise (Table B). 
If we assume that the sixth ship – the Delft from Delft – also had a cargo of 600,000 
guilders, the total value of imports during this period, from seven ships with a total 
tonnage of 4,380, amounted to 3.5 million guilders (or 799 guilders per ton). 
Consequently the VOC must have sold about 1.7 million guilders of spices from stock. 
For the period from September 1612 through April 1618 we can calculate total 
sales from the Enkhuizen chamber accounts, which recorded the VOC directors’ 
commission fees totaling 330,557 guilders for these months, split into five sub-periods. 
The directors received one per cent over equipment costs and sales revenues.62 To arrive 
at sales revenues, we need to deduct equipment costs and the back pay and other costs 
incurred over returned ships.  
 
                                                 
61 Source: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 11349, carta 141.  
62 The 1602 charter stipulated that company directors would not receive commission fees for dividend 
payments in kind or loans they contracted: Van Dam, 1927, I.1, 163. In addition to this the new company 
charter (per January 1st, 1623) stipulated that commissions would be calculated on the basis of net sales 
revenues, i.e. with cash rebates subtracted from gross revenues (Ibidem). 
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Table D. Wages and Miscellaneous Costs Related to Four Ships Returning to Enkhuizen 
(1610-1619) 
    
Year Wages Other costs Total costs 
    
1610 47,910  47,910 
1611 57,086  57,086 
1612   0 
1613 10,376 17,351 27,727 
1614 55,819 84,228 140,047 
1615   0 
1616 13,189 1,487 14,676 
1617 17,861 678 18,539 
1618 29,931 3,309 33,240 
1619 60,495 20,134 80,629 
    
Total 292,667 127,187 419,854 
    
Source: 
 
Based on back wages and other return costs incurred by the Enkhuizen Chamber for four 
ships returning to port between 1610 and 1619 (Table D), we estimate that in these years 
every ship arriving in the Dutch Republic cost the VOC 100,000 guilders. The resulting 
sales estimates for the period from September 1612 to April 1618 are reported in Table E.  
 
 
Table E, VOC sales estimates based on commission fees paid to company directors  for 
the period from 15 September 1612 to 15 April 1618 
       
Period 
Commission 
paid to VOC 
directors 
Est. sales + 
equipments 
Equipments 
(estimate) 
Return 
costs 
(estimate) 
Total sales 
(estimate) 
Per 
month 
       
Sep 1612 - Oct 1613 47,402.80 4,740,280 2,000,000 200,000 2,540,280 175,192 
Nov 1613 - Oct 1614 56,019.20 5,601,920 2,000,000 300,000 3,301,920 275,160 
Nov 1614 – Mar 1616 81,957.60 8,195,760 3,432,535 500,000 4,263,225 250,778 
Apr 1616 - Mar 1617 59,032.20 5,903,220 2,602,971 500,000 2,800,250 233,354 
Apr 1617 - Apr 1618 86,146.00 8,614,600 2,937,227 500,000 5,177,373 431,448 
       
Total 330,557.80 33,055,780 12,972,733 2,000,000 18,083,047 273,986 
       
Source: NA 1.04.02 VOC, Inv. No. 14854-I, carta 408: Reeckeninghe van Provisie 
 
 
For the period of April 1618 to March 1623 directors’ commission data are lacking, but 
from time to time letters sent to the company’s commander in Asia, Jan Pietersz Coen, 
mention sales figures amongst other data.63 In December 1620 the Amsterdam directors 
told him that their most recent equipment had cost 3.6 million guilders and at the same 
                                                 
63 In November 1615 and again in December 1616 the Amsterdam directors wrote to Coen that the 
company’s pepper, by far the most important product, had sold out: Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 333, 368). In 
*** and *** werd alle peper in een keer doorverkocht aan consortium of merchants. Check Glamann. In 
May 1619 the Heren XVII wrote to Coen that the nutmeg had sold out:  Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 420. 
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time they put the revenues of the four ships which had returned during 1620 at 3.5 
million guilders plus the back pay due. If we set this back pay at 75,000 guilders per ship 
(i.e. the average wages Enkhuizen paid to the crews of four returning ships between 1610 
and 1619) then the sales proceeds of these four ships amounted to 3.8 million guilders.64  
In the same letter to Coen the Amsterdam directors emphasized the company’s 
difficult financial situation, stating that the fitting of 39 ships between May 1618 and July 
1620 plus the costs of ships returning during that same period almost equaled the sales 
revenues in that same period, although 1618 had seen ‘a very good return’.65 If we 
assume return costs of 100,000 guilders for each of the fifteen ships arriving between 
April 1618 and April 1620 (cf. Table D) then we get sales revenues of 10.5 million 
guilders during these two years.66 
We can refine this estimate with a calculation made by the Heren XVII in a letter 
to Coen of March 1620. They estimated that they could sell between 455,000 and 
490,000 pounds of cloves, per year, 400,000 pounds of nutmeg, and 112,000 pounds of 
mace (pounds are Amsterdam pounds of 494,09 grams).67 Multiplying these figures with 
the company’s official spice prices for the years 1618-1620 given in Van Dam’s 
Beschryvinge gives an annual turnover in mace, nutmeg and cloves of 2.3-2.4 million 
guilders.68  
To this we need to add sales of the most important product, pepper. We do not 
have details about the annual volume of pepper which the company sold or expected to 
sell, but we can estimate it from a January 1618 report on the VOC’s financial position 
                                                 
64 Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 478. For a number of reasons it looks likely that the directors’ figure of 3.5 
million guilders was based on actual sales revenues. They wrote four months after the arrival of the four 
ships, and they themselves linked the amount to the expenses of the large fleet of 15 ships, of which 9 
departed in December 1620. Moreover, Van Dam’s Beschrijvinge (Vol. 1.2, p. 161) refers to the sale of all 
pepper during that year to a syndicate of merchants. 
65 “…hierby sullen cunnen sien, dat de twee jongste equipagien van 16 ende 23 schepen van den jare 1618 
ende 1619 gecost hebben volle 90 tonnen gouts, soodat deselve ende de betaelde maentgelden van de 
overgecommen retourschepen ende andere costen ende ongelden van de Generale Compagnie bynae soveel 
bedragen als de retoeren waerdich sijn geweest, die wy uyt Indien in dese twee jaren becommen hebben, 
nietyegenstaende ’t goet retour anno 1618 by U.E. ons gesonden.” Amsterdam directors to Coen, 12 
December 1620, (Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 476) 
66 De formulering van de brief uit 1620 maakt duidelijk dat de bewindhebbers bij deze berekening de 
verkoopopbrrengst van de Gouden Leeuw, Orangieboom, Dordrecht ende Westvrieslant, die tussen May 
and August 1620 terugkeerden in de Republiek, buiten beschouwing lieten.  
67 Coen, Bescheiden IV, 452-453. 
68 Van Dam, Beschrijvinge, Vol. 1.2, p. 163. 
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amongst the personal papers of the Amsterdam director Arnout Buchelius.69 According to 
the report the ships returning in 1618 were expected carry 8,000 bales of pepper worth 3 
million guilders, 2 million guilders’ worth of cloves, 1 million guilders in mace and 
nutmeg, and 0.5 million of mixed cargo, that is to say indigo, porcelain, diamonds, and 
other colonial wares. We also know from Van Dam’s Beschrijvinge that all pepper and 
mace imported during 1618 and 1619 was sold to merchant syndicates.70 Assuming that 
between April and December 1618 the company did indeed receive 8,000 bales or 
2,880,000 pounds of pepper and sold them for the price specified by Van Dam, then 
revenues from pepper sales during 1618 amounted to almost 3.3 million guilders.71 
Adding revenues from the sale of cloves, nutmeg, and mace at 2.3 million guilders plus 
miscellaneous merchandise worth another 500,000 guilders, we arrive at total sales 
revenues between April and December 1618 at 6.1 million guilders. This is a 
comparatively high figure, but, as we have seen, the company directors also referred to a 
‘very good return’.72 Combined with the estimated sales of 10.5 million guilders for the 
entire period from April 1618 to April 1620, this would put sales between January 1619 
and May 1620 at 4.4 million guilders.73 
To estimate sales between June 1621 and March 1623 we use several scattered 
references about expected and actual sales in letters to Jan Pietersz. Coen. In March 1621 
the Heren XVII reported the gist of talks with the English East India Company about 
European demand for pepper, mace, nutmeg, and cloves. The VOC representatives had 
told their English counterparts that they expected demand for nutmeg to fall by 25 per 
cent, that for cloves by 30-35 per cent (Table F). The directors did not expect pepper and 
mace sales to fall just then, but six months later, in October 1621, they wrote to Coen that 
                                                 
69 NA 1.11.01.01 (Aanwinsten Eerste Afdeling), Inv. No. 255, fol. 78v. 
70 Van Dam, Beschrijvinge, Vol. 1.2, p. 160-161. 
71 The pepper sales were contracted for 45½ groats, or 0,11375 cents, per pound : Van Dam, Beschrijvinge 
Vol. 1.2, p. 160. 
72 ‘…hierby sullen cunnen sien, dat de twee jongste equipagien van 16 ende 23 schepen van den jare 1618 
ende 1619 gecost hebben volle 90 tonnen gouts, soodat deselve ende de betaelde maentgelden van de 
overgecommen retourschepen ende andere costen ende ongelden van de Generale Compagnie bynae soveel 
bedragen als de retoeren waerdich sijn geweest, die wy uyt Indien in dese twee jaren becommen hebben, 
nietyegenstaende ’t goet retour anno 1618 by U.E. ons gesonden’, Amsterdam directors to Coen, 12 
December 1620, Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 476. 
73 During August **16??? the VOC once again sold all its pepper to a consortium of merchants but at a 
considerably lower price of 31 and 32 groats for pepper from the ships Mauritius en Zierikzee. Only the 
pepper from the Delft was sold at 43 to 46 groats per pound  (Van Dam, Beschrijvinge Vol. 1.2, p. 158). 
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the pepper which had arrived during June and July with the ships Walcheren, Mauritius 
en Wapen van Hoorn still had not been sold, and in December 1621 they again referred to 
stocks of unsold pepper.74 By then they had revised the sales estimates for pepper 
downward, from 2.8 million pounds per year to 1.7-2.0 million pounds . 75  
 
 
Table F, The VOC directors’ estimated European demand for spices in pounds, 1620-
1622 
     
 March 1620 March 1621 December 1621 September 1622 
     
Pepper  2,800,000 1,680,000 – 1,980,000  
Cloves 468,000 – 504,000 325,000  252,000 
Nutmeg 400,000 300,000   
Mace 112,000 120,000   
     
Source: Coen, Bescheiden IV, pp. 452, 482, 533, 563; Van Dam, Beschrijvinge, Vol. 1.2, p. 163 
 
For lack of a better gauge, we take the directors’ adjusted estimates for 1621 to reflect 
actual quantities of spices sold during that year. Based on the official prices in Van 
Dam’s Beschrijvinge for 1621 we set the sales of 2 million pounds of pepper at 0.8125 
guilders per pound, giving a sales total of 1,625,000 guilders; cloves sales of 325,000 
pounds at 3.30 guilders per pound resulting in a total of 1,089,000 guilders; 300,000 
pounds of nutmeg at 1.80 guilders per pound yielding 540,000 guilders, and finally mace 
at 3.30 guilders per pound totaling 396,000 guilders.76 Total spice sales would then have 
amounted 3,515,000 guilders. Total revenues will have been a different figure because 
the company sold an unknown amount of other colonial goods. Following the company’s 
own estimate of 1620 these may have amounted to as much as 500,000 guilders a year. 
Including these sales, we put total sales revenues for 1621 at 4 million guilders. 
During 1622 spices sales remained sluggish. The mace market proved saturated, 
but this problem had been shifted onto a consortium which had bought all mace for 1621 
and 1622. We therefore assume the VOC’s mace revenues during 1622 to have been 
equal to the year before. Slow nutmeg sales forced the company to repeated price cuts. 
                                                 
74 VOC directors to Coen, 24 October 1621, Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 519. 
75 According to the VOC directors, total European pepper demand had dropped from 20,000 bales to 
12,000-14,000 bales. We assume that the VOC’s prospective revenues had deteriorated accordingly, the 
more so because the company directors wanted Coen to limit purchases to 6,000-8,000 bales (i.e. 2.16 to 
2.88 million pounds . Anything more would remain unsold. VOC directors to Coen, 6 December 1621, 
Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 532-533. 
76 Van Dam, Beschrijvinge Vol. 1.2, p. 161-162; Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 543. 
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The 1621 contract with a merchants’ syndicate was not renewed and in April 1622 
directors complained that the nuts were difficult to shift, even at a reduced price of 1.65 
guilders per pound.77 Only a further reduction to 1.35 guilders per pound attracted 
sufficient buyers for the nutmeg to sell out by September.78  If volume remained the same 
as 1621, i.e. 300,000 pounds, then 1622 nutmeg sales at 1.35 guilders per pound should 
have generated revenues of 405,000 guilders. 
Sales of cloves and pepper were still more problematic. In September 1622 the 
company directors wrote to Coen that European demand for cloves had now dropped to 
320,000-360,000 pounds per year. A market sharing agreement between the VOC and the 
EIC from 1619 gave the English company one-third of these sales, so the VOC directors 
thought their own sales would not exceed 252,000 pounds per year, i.e. half the 1620 
volume.79 We assume that in 1622 these 252,000 pounds were sold at 3.30 guilders per 
pound.80 As for pepper, the company cleared its entire stock in September 1622 by 
selling out to a consortium of merchants at a very high discount and on condition that the 
company stopped selling pepper until June 1623.81 The 10,000 bales of pepper were sold 
for 60 cents per pound or a total of 2,160,000 guilders cash.82  
 Slow sales boosted spice stocks during late 1622 and early 1623. As early as April 
1622 VOC directors estimated their current stock of cloves (1.4 million pounds ) 
sufficient to meet European demand during three to four years, and with another 700,000 
pounds on the way the company had enough cloves for up to 8 years.83 At the official 
price of 3.30 guilders per pound these cloves represented a value of almost 7 million 
guilders, but given the huge surplus there was no way the company could realize this. 
                                                 
77 ***ref. 
78 ***ref. 
79 ‘Dan in t jaar 1622 is van hier geschreven, dat jaerlijcx niet meer soude kunnen werden verkogt als: 
Nagelen, 900 a 1000 quarteelen, yder van 360 pond is 314000 of 360000 pond respective, en dat de 
Engelse voor haar derde part daarin soude verkopen 350 quarteelen,ordonneerende dienvolgende, dat 
jaarlijcx niet meer souden senden als 700 quarteelen tot nader avijs, en ’t overige in Indien houden, om 
aldaar te werden gebenificeert ten meesten profyte van de Compagnie’. Probleem is: ‘En wort wyders 
daarby geschreven, dat men by experentie hadde bevonden, dat de Moluccos en Amboina wel tweemael 
sooveel nagelen voortbragten, als de geheele wereld konde vertieren’. En dan over de voorraad: ‘Men was 
doentertijt hier nog voorsien met 4000 quarteelen, behalven 2000, die in 't volgende jaar wierden verwagt, 
hetwelke men stelde voor 7 a 8 jaren genoeg te weesen’, Van Dam, Beschrijvinge Vol. 1.2, p. 163; Heren 
XVII to Coen, 17 September 1622, Coen, Bescheiden IV, 563. 
80 Cf. Van Dam, Beschrijvinge Vol. 1.2, p. 163 for the price of cloves. 
81 Cf. on the mounting pepper stocks in the company’s warehouses: Coen, Bescheiden IV, pp. 542, 552. 
82 Heren XVII to Coen, 17 September 1622, Coen, Bescheiden IV, p. 562. 
83 Van Dam, Beschrijvinge Vol. 1.2, p. 163. 
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Consequently directors decided in October 1623 to offload their problem on the 
shareholders by awarding a 25 per cent (1.6 million guilders) dividend in cloves, which, 
at 3.30 guilders per pound, reduced the value of that stock with 22.5%.84 Between April 
1622 and June 1623 pepper stocks worth 2.5 million guilders built up, forcing the 
company to another bulk transaction with a syndicate.85 
We assume total spice sales of 3.8 million guilders in cash between January 1622 
and March 1623, and again we add 500,000 guilders worth of other colonial wares, 
bringing total sales revenue for the sixteen months between January 1622 and March 
1623 to an estimated 4.3 million guilders. Table G shows estimated total sales per 
subperiod. 
 
                                                 
84  Van Dam, Beschrijvinge Vol. 1.2, p. 163. This stock’s actual value was of course much lower, and the 
directors’ resolutions about payment of dividends in kind in 1622 acknowledged this: Van Dam, 
Beschrijvinge Vol. 1.2, p. 165. 
85 Van Dam, Beschrijvinge, 1-2, p. 167. 
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Table G, Ship arrivals and estimated sales for the VOC, 1605-1623 
                  
Year Month Ship Tonnage Chamber 
Invoice 
value 
Sales 
value 
Total 
sales 
Sales per 
month 
         
1605 April Hof van Holland 360 Amsterdam     
         
1606 April Gouda 260 Amsterdam     
1606 April Gelderland 500 Amsterdam     
1606 July Geunieerde Provincien 700 Amsterdam     
1606 July Hoorn 700 Hoorn     
1606 October Amsterdam 700 Amsterdam     
1606 October Zeelandia 500 Zeeland     
         
1607 June Dordrecht 900 Zeeland     
         
    April 1605 - October 1607         2,600,000 86,667 
         
1608 May Witte Leeuw 540 Amsterdam     
1608 August Zwarte Leeuw 600 Amsterdam     
1608 September Oranje 700 Amsterdam     
1608 May Geunieerde Provintien 400 Delft     
1608 May Medemblik 250 Hoorn     
1608 May Amsterdam 700 Zeeland     
         
    November 1607 - February 1609         1,786,200 111,638 
         
1609 August Bantam 700/(900) Amsterdam     
1609 August Ceylon 340 Amsterdam     
1609 August Gouda  260 Amsterdam     
1609 August Ter Veere 700 Zeeland     
         
    March 1609 - August 1610         671,250 37,292 
         
1610 June Gelderland 500 Amsterdam     
1610 June Zeelandia 500 Zeeland     
1610 July Rode Leeuw met Pijlen 400 Amsterdam     
1610 July Banda 600/(800) Amsterdam     
1610 July Patania 340 Enkhuizen  1,050,007 
 
  
         
    September 1610 - July 1611         1,342,500 122,045 
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1611 June Ceylon (+Erasmus) 340 Amsterdam  1,082,854   
1611 June Hoorn 700 Hoorn  559,488   
1611 June Geunieerde Provincien 700 Amsterdam  572,405   
1611 June Rotterdam 800 Rotterdam 461,378 802,106   
1611 August Oranje 700 Zeeland  589,156   
1611 August Delft 800 Delft     
         
    August 1611 - 15 September 1612         5,195,573 384,857 
         
1612 July Middelburg 800 Zeeland     
1612 July Hollandia 800 Amsterdam     
         
    15 September 1612 - October 1613         2,540,280 188,169 
         
1613 October Wapen van Amsterdam 800 Amsterdam     
1613 September Bantam 900/(700) Enkhuizen     
1613 September Vlissingen 600 Zeeland     
         
    November 1613 - October 1614         3,301,920 275,160 
         
1614 August Zwarte Leeuw 600 Amsterdam 268,964    
1614 August Ter Veere 700 Zeeland 164,562    
         
1615  Delft 800 Delft 127,181    
1615 April Hert 280 Rotterdam 23,982    
1615 November Oranjeboom 360 Hoorn     
         
    November 1614 - Maart 1616         4,263,225 250,778 
         
1616 June Groene Leeuw 140 Amsterdam 21,160    
1616 August Witte Beer 300 Amsterdam     
1616 September Mauritius 800 Amsterdam 231,099    
1616 September Rotterdam 800 Rotterdam 192,449    
1616 September Dolfijn 280 Zeeland 32,449    
         
    April 1616 - Maart 1617         2,800,250 233,354 
         
1617 March Zwarte Beer 320 Amsterdam 88,907    
1617 March Hert 280 Delft 39,787    
1617 June Zeelandia 800 Zeeland 189,448    
1617 July Wapen van Amsterdam 800 Amsterdam     
1617 October Westfriesland 800 Hoorn 136,414    
         
    April 1617 - 15 April 1618         5,177,373 414,190 
  
 60 
         
1618 March Postpaard 300 Enkhuizen 48,766    
1618 April Oranjeboom 360 Hoorn 56,526    
1618 July Eenhoorn 300 Amsterdam 145,787    
1618 July Enkhuizen 500 Enkhuizen 140,348    
1618 July Wapen van Zeeland 700 Zeeland 243,775    
1618 October Eendracht 700 Amsterdam 235,346    
1618 October Walcheren 500/600 Zeeland 137,398    
1618 November Goede Fortuin 700 Amsterdam 300,010    
         
    16 April 1618 - December 1618         6,100,000 717,647 
         
1619 January Ter Tholen 400 Zeeland 143,970    
1619 January Witte Beer 300 Amsterdam 60,491    
1619 May Mauritius 800 Amsterdam 249,883    
1619 May Zierikzee 800 Zeeland 157,705    
1619 August Delft 800 Delft 461,998    
1620 January Eenhoorn 300 Amsterdam 87,711    
1620 March Zwarte Beer 320 Amsterdam 123,667    
         
    Jan 1619 - April 1620         4,400,000 275,000 
         
1620 May Gouden Leeuw 550 Rotterdam 195,913    
1620 July Oranjeboom 360 Rotterdam 37,096    
1620 August Westfriesland 800 Zeeland 214,263    
1620 August Dordrecht 800 Amsterdam 218,086    
         
    May 1620 - December 1620         4,000,000 500,000 
         
1621 February Vrede 340 Amsterdam 95,238    
1621 March Witte Beer 300 Amsterdam 83,309    
1621  Mauritius 800 Amsterdam 278,968    
1621 July Wapen van Hoorn 400/600 Hoorn 203,256    
1621 June Walcheren 500/600 Zeeland 118,121    
         
    January - December 1621         3,842,820 320,235 
         
1622 February Leiden 700 Amsterdam 315,137    
1622 February Wapen van Enkhuizen 700 Enkhuizen 228,100    
1622 April Medemblik 300 Hoorn 130,191    
1622 June Hollandia 700 Amsterdam 316,067    
1622 June Middelburg 700 Zeeland 268,324    
1622 August Westfriesland 800 Zeeland 283,047    
1622 September Gouda 800 Amsterdam 275,888    
1622 December Schoonhoven 400 Amsterdam 151,234    
1622 December Naarden 180 Amsterdam 62,754    
         
    January 1622 – March 1623          4,292,600 286,173 
         
